

**ASSESSMENTS & APPEALS:  
STRENGTHENING NON-FOOD EMERGENCY RESPONSES IN ETHIOPIA**

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**THE LIVELIHOODS PROGRAM**



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## Acronyms

ATF	Agriculture Task Force
ARI	Acute Respiratory Infection
BoARD	Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development
BoWR	Bureau of Water Resources
CSI	Child Survival Initiative (also called EOS)
DA	Development Agent
DBS	Direct Budgetary Support
DPPB	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau
DPPC	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
CBO	Community Based Organization
CFW	Cash for Work
CSB	Corn Soya Blend
CSI	Child Survival Initiative
CTC	Community Based Therapeutic Care
ENCU	Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit
EOS	Enhanced Outreach Strategy
EWS	Early Warning System
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FSCB	Food Security Coordination Bureau
HSDP	Health Sector Development Plan
IDPs	Internally Displaced Populations
IO	International Organization
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices
MANT	Multi-Agency Nutrition Task Force
MoARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoWR	Ministry of Water Resources
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NRU	Nutrition Rehabilitation Unit
NPDPM	National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (1993)
NDPPF	National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Fund
OTP	Outpatient Therapeutic Program
PCDP	Pastoral Community Development Program
PHDS	Phased Disaster Management Systems
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Program
RHB	Regional Health Bureau
RUTF	Ready-To-Use-Therapeutic Food
SFP	Supplementary Feeding Program
SNNPR	Southern Nations and Nationalities People's Region
TFC	Therapeutic Feeding Center
TSFP	Targeted Supplementary Feeding Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WES	Water and Environmental Sanitation

## Team Approach to the TOR

From mid-August to mid-September 2005, a USAID-funded consulting team conducted an analysis of non-food emergency assessment methodologies and structures in Ethiopia.<sup>1</sup> The team's work was intended to provide immediate technical support to on-going processes of emergency non-food assessments and to stimulate debates on an agenda for strengthening the disaster management systems needed to identify, resource and address emergency non-food aid needs, including contingency plans, assessments and appeals.

USAID and DPPC offered the team strong support by providing direction, arranging meetings and offering critical analyses throughout the assignment. The team also enjoyed good cooperation and a high level of interest from a range of humanitarian actors in and outside of government. Ministerial meetings provided the opportunity to examine the appeal process and disaster management issues pertaining to non-food emergency needs at the highest level of government. Draft findings were presented in two fora: an open technical meeting at the DPPC and a high level government, UN and donor meeting jointly convened by USAID and the DPPC. The team donated approximately \$1,500 in training resources to the Health and Nutrition and the Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) Task Forces. Case studies were conducted in Oromiya and SNNPR to trace how some 2005 non-food aid appeal numbers were derived from woreda to federal level. The team met with emergency task forces at the federal level as a whole as well as with key governmental and UN staff assigned to task forces to discuss improvements on assessment methodologies. The team provided written guidance, revised assessment formats and gave presentations to the Health and Nutrition, Water and Sanitation and Agriculture and Livestock Task Forces. This report contains a number of annexes.

- Annex I: The Water and Environmental Sanitation Rapid Assessment Format is a copy of recommendations on the WES Task Force's assessment format, with a particular emphasis on strengthening measures for the control of diarrhoeal diseases. The team recommended adapting questions based on the Sphere Project to more effectively assess potential environmental hazards, water and sanitation needs. The task force is considering how to incorporate the team's suggestions into their assessments.
- Annex II summarizes the findings of the team's case studies on how non-food emergency needs assessments in Oromiya and SNNPR influenced the 2005 annual appeal.
- Annex III: Strengthening the Assessment and Response to Non-food Emergency Nutrition Needs considers the work of the ENCU and suggests how basic, underlying and immediate causes of malnutrition can be better monitored and addressed. This annex addresses issues pertaining to a broad approach to malnutrition, including linking nutrition surveillance with proxy indicators for the rapid identification of and response to nutrition crises.
- Annex IV: Bibliography for Health is a list of emergency health, water, sanitation and nutrition books, manuals and resources donated by the team to offices of the MoH and MoWR task force chairmen for needs assessment and response strategies. The team met frequently with the task force, provided guidance on health and nutrition assessment tools and

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<sup>1</sup> For further information regarding the scope of work or a list of people and organizations consulted, please contact the team leader, Sue Lautze, Director, The Livelihoods Program – Saving Lives & Livelihoods, 13778 SW Meadowview Dr., Camp Sherman, OR, 97730, USA, slautze@aol.com.

traveled to Nazareth for a training of RHB staff on contingency planning and emergency assessments.

- Annex V: Agriculture and Livestock Emergency Management provides an overview of hazards monitored by the task force and identifies steps for improving agriculture and livestock non-food disaster management. A draft Terms of Reference proposes that agriculture and livestock emergency offices should collect baseline information, improve assessment processes, manage early warning systems and contingency funds, coordinate responses, document lessons learned and adapt standards and guidelines. The annex provides an overview of best practices in multi-sector mitigation, prevention, response and recovery in pastoral areas, largely based on experiences elsewhere in the region.
- Annex VI: Emergency Agricultural Inputs Requirements Assessment Methodology is a copy of suggestions made to the Agriculture and Emergency Task Force's assessment formats.<sup>2</sup> The team met with representatives from the task force to discuss ways of improving assessments to more effectively inform emergency agriculture and livestock-based approaches to disaster vulnerabilities, especially human malnutrition and morbidity. The task force is considering how to incorporate the team's suggestions into their assessments.

This report ends with a ten-point agenda for strengthening non-food emergency disaster assessments and appeals, contingency planning and the underlying management system needed to ensure that, when crises overwhelm communities, resources are provided in a timely, impartial, appropriate and effective fashion. It is hoped that the government, donor, UN and NGO community can come together to debate and devise an action plan based on this agenda.

1. Strengthen mechanisms and secure high-level support for inter-ministerial (MoH/MoWR/MoARD; RHB/BoWR/BoARD) and inter-agency (FAO/UNICEF/WFP) joint disaster management approaches to key threats of malnutrition, morbidity, mortality and livelihoods collapse/destitution;
2. Establish permanent, staffed, capacitated, empowered, accountable and resourced emergency offices in the line ministries/bureaus (health, water resources, agriculture, education);
3. Donors and FDRE to provide resources for offset-exempt, grant-based contingency funds at the regional level, for rapid non-food responses to zonal and woreda emergency needs; promote increased utilization of the grant funding mechanism in the NDPPF;
4. Commit to adapting international minimum standards for humanitarian assistance (e.g. Sphere) and innovating best practices in support of vulnerability-based, integrated, multi-sector, non-food aid emergency response strategies;
5. Conduct (and routinely monitor) comprehensive hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis;
6. Use existing development resources and create special transition programs/funds to support multi-year initiatives for non-food disaster mitigation, preparedness, prevention and recovery;
7. Establish (in advance of crises) civil-military and mutual aid agreements (e.g. to govern the transfer of emergency resources between regions);
8. Increase development investment in components of non-food Early Warning Systems (e.g. baseline livelihoods studies/monitoring and human nutrition/disease and animal disease surveillance);
9. Strengthen the technical capacity of the DPPC for coordination of non-food emergency responses; and
10. Develop a system of urban disaster management.

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<sup>2</sup> The original formats are too long to be included in this report. Copies are available from the task force.

Not all issues analyzed here are unique to Ethiopia. If Ethiopia can make progress on the challenges explored in this and other reports, not only will lives be saved but the country will stand in good position, once again, to serve as a locus for innovation in best practices in disaster management from which the rest of the world can benefit. This is not just a trite statement. The work was undertaken in Ethiopia as regions elsewhere were engulfed in natural disasters that required highly effective, life-saving, non-food disaster interventions, for example, Hurricane Katrina in the USA, droughts and fires in Portugal, floods in Romania, and famine in Niger. Many of these crises highlighted, once again, how even natural disasters have sharply defined man-made vulnerabilities, how it is often the most politically and socially marginalized that suffer disproportionately, and how the poor, the infirm and the aged often have few coping strategies. These crises underscore that it is vitally important that appropriately structured, empowered and resourced standing capacities for disaster management – especially non-food aid disaster management and especially suited for a broad range of hazards - exist in every country. Failure to heed these tasks not only risks lives, communities and economic growth, but can be a source of political vulnerability. Other relevant lessons emerging from these crises include both the challenges and the importance of:

- Realistic ‘worst case scenario’ planning;
- Adequate attention to EWS warnings;
- Pre-crisis investment in mitigation and prevention as a highly cost-effective way of minimizing human, economic and social costs of disasters;
- Integrated, multi-sectoral response strategies for IDPs;
- Pre-established mechanisms for collaboration between civil, military and police forces;
- Support to the NGO sector and UN Agencies;
- Understanding of the risks when long term development strategies and policies either ignore or increase disaster hazards and related vulnerabilities;
- Pre-established horizontal arrangements for mutual aid, e.g. from neighbouring states, to facilitate rapid response;
- Contingency stocks and funds, with pre-established mechanisms guiding their use;
- Information systems (via the internet, media, short-wave radio, CBOs or public announcement systems) for disaster-affected populations, even when communication links are down, and,
- Providing assistance to people who will risk their lives in order to protect their livelihoods.

## **Non-Food Emergency Appeals**

The team was asked to consider steps for strengthening the methodologies and structures of the emergency non-food assessment process that informed appeals. Appeals, of course, represent only the tip of the iceberg. Starting in 2005, appeal content and levels were derived based on a process of consultation, technical assessment and political negotiation at every turn (woreda, region, and federal levels) involving both government and humanitarian organizations. This is as it should be. Appeals should not be based merely on the collective requests of officials from Ethiopia’s more than five hundred woredas. In addition, the 2005 approach was an improvement

over previous years because it was the first time the woreda and zonal authorities had been involved at all in the process of assessing non-food needs. However, concern was expressed that the non-food assessments and appeal negotiations were still - like the base of an iceberg - hidden from view and of unknown dimensions. These problems nearly resulted in the 2005 non-food appeal not being released by government. Officials were concerned that woredas tended to exaggerate requests for non-food assistance. It is this lack of knowledge and transparency that undermines confidence in emergency non-food appeals, while resulting in a number of other problems. The opaque process demoralizes technical staff at all levels and leads to a misrepresentation of the scale and scope of the humanitarian crises affecting various populations. Weaknesses in the emergency non-food aid assessment, contingency planning and appeals process all too often renders food aid as the only *de facto* form of relief assistance reaching populations in need, regardless of the nature of their vulnerability. While noting that this situation is not unique to Ethiopia (see Box 1), it remains important to move quickly to resolve weaknesses in the system because extensive populations remain highly vulnerable to disasters, even in times not characterized by major droughts.

**Box 1. Uganda, Burundi and DRC Emergency Food Security Interventions**

“Missing The Point: An analysis of food security interventions in the Great Lakes” (Levine et al., 2004) reviews seven humanitarian food security programs in Uganda, Burundi and the DRC. Humanitarian responses common to all seven case studies included free food distribution, seeds and tools distributions and feeding centers, responses familiar in the context of disasters in Ethiopia. The study noted:

- Regardless of the nature of the vulnerability, only a very limited range of relief interventions (food aid, seeds/tools and nutrition) were provided by humanitarian organizations;
- Most food security interventions failed to address assessed vulnerabilities;
- Only limited consideration was given to the appropriateness of response;
- There was an over-reliance on food production as the key to addressing interlocking vulnerabilities;
- Assessments failed to consider key issues contributing to vulnerability (e.g. market and economic information; gender; conflict; political discrimination; intra-household discrimination);
- Assessment weaknesses resulted in inadequate and inappropriate responses;
- There was poor utilization of available information;
- Cost-effectiveness of responses was not considered; had it been, less food aid and more non-food aid interventions, including cash-based responses, would have been used;
- Lack of priority on lessons learned highlighted the need for training in simple tools for rapid and inexpensive impact assessment and the utility of grey (unpublished) literature reviews.

Visit [www.odihpn.org](http://www.odihpn.org) for a free copy of the report.

Disasters, according to the FDRE (2004), result when people are overwhelmed beyond their coping capacities to such an extent that they “cannot any longer meet the need for food and other basic necessities (for)...daily life thus falling into crisis which renders (them) unable to survive without assistance from others”. In times of need, a great deal of “assistance from others” in Ethiopia is provided by family members, neighbors, benevolent strangers, religious and other local institutions, and the government. The international community provides exceptional levels of quality relief and development assistance as well. Despite these efforts, significant numbers of Ethiopians, especially children, die annually because they are not assisted when they are overwhelmed by sudden events, such as floods, epidemics, conflicts and population

displacement, by slow-onset crises such as drought or malaria epidemics, by enduring conditions of destitution, or by the unintended consequences of development programs. A portion of this suffering can and should be alleviated using resources obtained through both flash and twelve/twelve-plus month humanitarian appeals, in addition to multi-year special recovery programs and long-term development projects. For this reason, the team emphasized the importance of taking into account a broad range of funding mechanisms in the course of assessing resource requirements and availabilities for strategies to address identified vulnerabilities.

Ethiopia has faced disasters of great scale where the fundamental tasks of providing emergency food, shelter, water, sanitation, health, nutrition, agriculture and livestock support, hazard management and security to highly vulnerable populations have challenged a broad coalition of humanitarian actors. Since 2001, emergency non-food appeals have averaged over \$79 million annually, ranging from a low of \$37 million in 2002 to a high of \$121 million in 2003. Responses to the non-food appeal vary extensively by sector and by year.<sup>3</sup> Over time, the range of activities included in the annual emergency appeal has become increasingly narrow.

**Table 1. Emergency Non-Food Aid Appeals 2001 – 2005 (USD) and Pledged (%)**

	2001	2002	2003 Revised Appeal	2004	2005 Revised Appeal	Average
<b>Agriculture &amp; Livestock</b>	20,457,500	3,700,995	26,572,145 (88%)	13,150,200 (95%)	9,304,479 (47%)	14,637,064
<b>Coordination</b>	2,150,000	1,100,000	1,100,000 (139%)	1,573,000 (35%)	1,614,700 (98%)	1,609,425
<b>Water/Environmental Sanitation</b>	5,024,400	6,007,094	34,695,045 (51%)	24,830,080 (58%)	22,152,456 (35%)	18,541,815
<b>Health &amp; Nutrition</b>	14,918,575	10,000,906	42,246,823 (132%)	17,930,340 (45%)	43,023,401# (45%)	25,624,009
<b>Capacity Building</b>	---	2,815,814	5,556,688 (24%)	14,672,290 (4%)	6,539,980 (0%)	7,396,193
<b>HIV/AIDS</b>	2,304,425*	---	4,865,100 (1%)	2,699,500 (0%)	---	3,782,300
<b>Mine action</b>	4,434,750	---	---	---	---	4,434,750
<b>Education</b>			3,364,000 (2%)	2,449,330 (4%)		2,906,665
<b>Gender/ Child protection/ Shelter</b>	1,660,312 ⊕		3,011,997 (34%)			3,011,997
<b>Refugees</b>	23,291,648	---	---	---	---	23,291,648
<b>Other non-food</b>	807,263	13,677,321	---	13,607,607 (0%)	---	9,364,064
<b>Total Non-Food</b>	<b>76,888,873</b> ✧ (35%)	<b>37,302,130</b>	<b>121,411,798</b> (86%)	<b>77,304,740</b> (64%)	<b>82,635,016</b> (44%)	<b>79,108,511</b>

\*2001 figure includes HIV/AIDS, Gender and Education; ⊕2001 figure for shelter only; ✧2001 total appeal was later revised to \$85,239,533 (31%); #2005 Supplementary food component has been subtracted.

<sup>3</sup> Table 1 is based on annual appeals and related updates/flash appeals from 2001 – 2005. Data on donor pledges was provided by OCHA. The FDRE and the UN are challenged by methodological difficulties in quantifying/qualifying/tracking non-food responses. The numbers presented here should be treated with caution.



The government judges the success of its appeal on the level of donor responses. In interviews with the team, government officials attributed poor donor responses to non-food aid requests to a lack of transparency in the appeal process. Some donors have additional resources available for emergency non-food programs that are not being released. It is hoped that improved appeals, based on more sound and transparent assessment methodologies, will meet with more robust donor responses. This assumes that donors use the appeal to determine their response strategies, which is not always the case. For donors, appeals are viewed as only one of several indications of the nature and scope of crises in Ethiopia. One donor noted that appeals are often released too late and in reaction to a situation that has already turned critical.


Over time, with the exception of very large scale crises, fewer donors are likely to respond to external appeals and will rely instead on the FDRE to use DBS resources to manage assessed vulnerabilities. Improved assessment and appeals processes cannot be guaranteed to induce more consistent and generous donor pledges against appeals but, more importantly, they will lead to more effective responses to disaster vulnerabilities. The success of the disaster management system should increasingly be judged more on the system's ability to respond to critical needs and less on the "bottom line" of donor responses.

Aside from the obvious concern that identified humanitarian needs are not met, poor responses to routine non-food appeals raise other problems. In field interviews with the team, some civil servants responsible for appeals expressed concern that they were losing credibility within government while others at the woreda, zonal and regional levels said they were growing weary of routinely filling in assessment forms that often did not produce any additional resources. As a result, it was becoming increasingly difficult to convince key actors to be involved adequately in assessments and appeals processes. From a management point of view, this is understandable. Poor and inconsistent responses to external appeals mean that government agencies cannot rationally plan interventions using external funds. There appears to be a higher degree of certainty in the resources available in domestic budgets but these resources are rarely sufficient.

## **Disaster Assessment and Appeal Process Model**

While working with emergency non-food task forces on the immediate objective of strengthening on-going assessments, the team considered the full process of non-food assessment and appeals, using an adapted version of a basic disaster management model. **Appealing for extraordinary disaster assistance should be one, non-routine step grounded in a broad structure of routine and consistent disaster management.** Appeals for external assistance should arise when prioritized humanitarian resource needs outstrip in-country resource availability, but this is not where the process begins. Hazards and related risks and vulnerabilities should be identified and routinely monitored; contingency plans and response strategies should be actively and regularly developed, reviewed and refined; as contingencies threaten to become realities, the full range of needed resources should be estimated and prioritized, and available resources should be identified. The appeal for extraordinary emergency assistance should be based on the gap between prioritized resource needs and existing or potentially available and accessible resources. This is depicted in Figure 1, below. The tasks underlying the appeal process should be pursued continuously as a matter of routine disaster management. The team used this model in its work with all task forces.

**Figure 1. Assessment and Appeals Processes** (adapted from (WHO, 1999))



## Hazard, Risk and Vulnerability Identification

If appeals for extraordinary emergency resource requirements can be thought of as the tip of the iceberg, routine hazard, risk and vulnerability identification and monitoring can be thought of as the base. Hazards are phenomena that have the potential to cause harm to populations (Wisner and Adams, 2002). Hazards in Ethiopia include, among others, flood, conflict, population displacement, drought, earthquake, epidemics, epizootics (livestock disease outbreaks), pests, crop diseases, landslide, economic shock, and the various acute vulnerabilities that inadvertently arise from large-scale development schemes. In addition, the combined forces of demography and climate change pose extremely serious threats to Ethiopia.

Not all hazards will become disasters. Vulnerability is “the degree to which a population, individual or organization is unable to anticipate, cope with, resist and recovery from the impacts of disasters” (Blaikie, 1994). Vulnerability encompasses the interrelationship between hazards and the balance between susceptibility to and resilience against threats.<sup>4</sup> Hazards, risks and capacity to cope must be analyzed in order to understand the nature of vulnerability across and within populations. Although the humanitarian community is concerned with a fairly narrow range of threats to lives and livelihoods (e.g. acute malnutrition, sharply elevated morbidity patterns, increased excess mortality, imminent threats of destitution), the pathways to these outcomes are multiple and varied. Livelihood baseline studies and livelihoods-based early warning systems are very important for monitoring these multiple pathways (Raven-Roberts et al., 2004). However, Ethiopia’s disaster hazard, risk and vulnerability monitoring system is oriented predominantly towards identifying and responding to drought-related emergency food aid needs. **Comprehensive and routine analysis of multiple hazard-related risks and vulnerabilities is not conducted in Ethiopia.** This is because of 1) the relatively higher risk of drought as compared to other hazards, and the dominance of drought-related emergency food aid

<sup>4</sup> Different analysts use alternative equations to represent this relationship. The DPPC uses  $R = H \times V / C$ , where; R=risk; H= hazard; V= vulnerability; and C= coping capacity.

response mechanisms, 2) over-reliance on development schemes to reduce disaster vulnerability (and related hope that development will ‘eradicate’ disasters), 3) institutional structures, attitudes and practices that prohibitively determine and delimit the scope for disaster management, and 4) inadequate investment in livelihood analysis, routine human and animal health surveillance systems, and other forms of (non-food) early warning and vulnerability analysis systems.

Slow onset droughts have caused extreme levels of suffering among Ethiopia’s agricultural and pastoral populations. A great deal of effort has been invested by the DPPC, the MoARD, WFP and FAO in vulnerability assessments focusing on food and crop production. The risk of drought relative to other hazards dictates that limited resources should be directed towards management of the prevailing hazard. The FDRE’s efforts to mitigate drought hazards should not be underestimated and should be applauded and encouraged as an example of responsible governance. UNICEF and the RHB have become more active in recent years through the EOS in hazard, risk and vulnerability monitoring. In general, systems remain influenced by a ‘food first’ bias and there is much work yet to be done. **The existing disaster management system is not structured to assess or address adequately the full range of hazards – rural and urban - that pose real risks to the population. In particular, the disaster management system is poorly equipped to monitor emergency non-food needs regardless of hazard, including in times of drought.**

Contributing to the lack of regular and comprehensive hazard, risk and vulnerability identification is a conceptual debate regarding the differences between ‘chronic’ and ‘acute’ vulnerabilities and related needs. There is a strong desire that the non-food assessment and appeal processes clearly distinguish between chronic and acute vulnerabilities; however, the two concepts are not mutually exclusive. Writing on issues of destitution and poverty in Ethiopia, Devereux (2003) usefully points out that chronic refers to a period of time while acute refers to the severity or depth of suffering. From a humanitarian point of view, some problems may be both chronic (i.e., persistent, recurrent or predictable) and acute (i.e., at an extreme level of suffering); others may be chronic but not acute (i.e., recurrent, predictable but not extreme), and still others can be acute but not chronic (i.e., not predictable but extreme). This latter category – acute not chronic - was often described as a ‘real’ emergency by donors and government officials during the team’s meetings.

In years when rains are favorable (e.g. 2000, 2005), the bias towards drought and food aid in the EWS runs the risk of inducing a sense of complacency about monitoring other hazards or maintaining focus on strategies to mitigate, prevent and respond to current and future disasters and well as recover from recent crisis. It is easiest to gain attention to these issues when crises are at their most acute but, of course, this is invariably too late. There are additional challenges for disaster managers. The very existence of domestic and foreign disaster structures, policies and resources are considered in some quarters as a failure of development, a source of shame, or even an invitation to disasters itself.

Further, there is concern that disaster assistance generates dependencies among vulnerable populations. A recent ODI report defines ‘dependency syndrome’ as: *‘an attitude and belief that a group cannot solve its own problems without outside help’* (Harvey and Lind, 2005). The report points out that, **from a humanitarian perspective, short-term dependency is a positive sign that emergency assistance has been provided in a relevant, timely and appropriate fashion.** They note that much of the discourse on dependency is a form of “blaming the victim”

and masks analysis of the weaknesses in both disaster management systems and development approaches. Dependency has become the subject of much emergency vs. development debate in Ethiopia, with the latter advocated as necessary to prevent dependency. Many within government, the humanitarian community and beneficiary communities negatively associate dependency with emergency relief food. A more constructive direction for this debate may be how to focus on increasing emergency non-food aid responses when food aid is not the most appropriate option for countering disaster-related vulnerabilities. Separating the myth of dependency from the reality of effective humanitarian assistance is important to protect against arbitrary limitations on the content, scope and scale of non-food emergency responses and to guard against premature shifts into development programs in emergency-affected areas (Kibreab, 1993, Macrae and Bradbury, 1998).

There is a prevailing philosophy among some in Ethiopia that disaster hazards can be eliminated through successful development strategies, and that therefore the best humanitarian strategy for Ethiopia is to increase development aid. There is no question that development resources are vitally needed to address some of the root causes of vulnerability to disasters and to improve policies, institutions and processes needed to enhance disaster mitigation/preparedness, response, prevention and recovery capacities. Mitigating disaster risks should be a prime aim of development in Ethiopia. The resources and efforts required to strengthen non-food emergency responses in Ethiopia should complement and be complemented by ambitious and important development issues, such as the MoH HSDP, the MoWR Universal Access Program and the 3.5 billion Birr FSCB programs. For all these and other development initiatives, it should be recalled that **even as countries develop, new and different forms of risk and vulnerabilities evolve even as old forms are mitigated (but never fully eliminated).**

There is an unfavorable political environment for disaster managers to monitor or respond to the types of risks associated with development programs in Ethiopia. Development activities may inadvertently create acute vulnerabilities by exposing populations to new risks or by focusing limited human, organizational and technical resources on development programs. This is not an argument against development; rather, these points serve as reminders of the importance of monitoring the full spectrum of disaster hazards, risks and vulnerabilities concomitantly while using development resources to build household, community and institutional resilience. The team spent much time with the task forces on this issue, arguing the importance of developing contingency plans and response strategies to both natural and man-made hazards so that rapid actions can be undertaken to minimize suffering.

## Management Structures

Developing, empowering and maintaining permanent structures for disaster hazard identification, contingency planning, disaster preparedness and crisis response are important functions not only of good governance but are also essential safeguards to protect household, community and national assets. The significance of institutional arrangements was recognized in the 1993 NPDPM (1.1) which states “There shall be clearly defined focal points of action for different tasks at different levels; and centers of coordination shall be properly empowered.” The 1993 NPDPM and the DPPC proclamations (1995, 2004) vested institutional responsibility for coordinating disaster management, including non-food responses, in the DPPC. Until 2004, the DPPC was an ‘autonomous federal institution’ accountable to the Council of Ministers. The

Amended Proclamation (2004) now requires the DPPC to report to the MoARD. The DPPC relies on building consensus across line ministries for the coordination of humanitarian assistance, including non-food aid. For all its strengths and weaknesses, this is akin to the UN's model of coordination where OCHA relies largely on consensus across UN agencies to achieve coordinated responses. The role for the DPPC in facilitating the coordination of non-food responses remains a key function. Given the food-aid focus of the DPPC, it is important that some DPPC/B staff be designated as full-time non-food aid focal points and that they be adequately trained in the fields of emergency health, nutrition, cash-based responses, environmental hazard management, agriculture, livestock, shelter, etc., so that the DPPC may be more effective in its non-food coordination role.

The vast, complex nature of disaster hazards, risks and vulnerabilities require that institutional disaster management structures be fundamentally immune to the waxing and waning of international disaster relief flows, domestic political concerns, or key individual energy and commitment levels. Such structures require investment. However, when capacity building for disaster management has been included in twelve-month appeals, it has been critically underfunded, e.g. 24% in 2003, 4% in 2004 and 0% to date in 2005. **There can be no improvement in the quality of non-food emergency assessments, appeals and response strategies without significant investments by government, donors, UN agencies and NGOs in the FDRE's non-food disaster management capacity using both humanitarian and development resources.**

Despite a complex hazard profile and a high frequency of disaster events, the FDRE's disaster management system relies extensively on ad hoc structures, especially for non-food disaster response, prevention, mitigation/preparedness and recovery. Overall, **Ethiopia's system of non-food emergency management is undermined by dissonance between responsibilities, structures and capacities.** The DPPC is organized mainly around food-aid responses to slow onset drought crises and lacks capacity in non-food hazard identification (including rapid onset crises), contingency planning or emergency response. Key line ministries lack adequately institutionalized disaster management structures, including standing emergency offices at the federal and regional levels. This is due in part to the various proclamations that guide the ministries and the DPPC. Responsibility for disasters clearly rests within the DPPC. Sectoral responsibilities for disaster management have not been articulated in line ministry proclamations.<sup>5</sup>

Since 2003, the resulting gaps created by this structure of emergency non-food management have been filled partially by a system of technical task forces. The task forces meet on an ad hoc basis depending upon requests from the DPPC, the nature of identified disaster vulnerabilities and the availability of task force chairmen. The non-food task forces (Health and Nutrition, Agriculture and Livestock and WES) are chaired by line ministries (MoH, MoARD and MoWR, respectively). The meetings are attended by representatives of FDRE, UN agencies, donors and NGOs but attendance is highly varied, both in terms of the number and the relative degree of authority of participants. Despite the multidisciplinary nature of the task forces, ministry staff rarely attend task force meetings if the meeting is not chaired by their particular ministry. Even for meetings chaired by a line ministry, attendance by key line ministry technical staff is uneven

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<sup>5</sup> The DPPC and FSCB recently suggested measures to strengthen this based on a study tour of Bangladesh. See the *Report on the Bangladesh Study Tour*, DPPC and FSCB, June 6 – 16, 2004, Addis Ababa.

since attendance is voluntary. Within the DPPC, designated focal points are not required to attend task force meetings so the DPPC is not always represented at task force meetings.

The task force chairmen all suffer from unenviable workloads; no chairman is able to focus full time on disaster management responsibilities. For example, the MoWR task force chairman and his limited staff are trying to balance their roles in a (very important) \$260,000,000 development agenda with task force responsibilities. The burden placed on the MoH task force chairman was acknowledged by the State Minister who warmly described him as “that poor guy”. It is the task force (i.e., a rather arbitrary gathering of individuals who attend meetings voluntarily) rather than the chairmen that has serious responsibilities for monitoring disaster vulnerability, developing contingency plans, determining assistance requirements and coordinating sectoral disaster response programs. For example, the Health and Nutrition Task Force was charged with resolving all health/nutrition sector problems identified in the joint evaluation of the 2002/03 crisis. The lack of permanent, empowered and staffed institutional structures for disaster management within the line ministries has direct implications for emergency non-food assessments including:

- There is no obvious locus for capacity building in non-food technical and general disaster management, or focal offices for adapting best practices in and minimum standards of assistance on which response strategies should be based.
- The lack of institutional memory, basic files or access to and management of baseline data means that assessment exercises collect basic baseline information each year. This information is collected from woreda officials who have grown weary of providing the same information year in, year out to a wide variety of task forces, assessment teams, and consultants who visit more regularly than the *meher* rains. Expensive and time-consuming assessment exercises, therefore, cannot strictly focus on the key tasks of high-quality information gathering and verification/triangulation of data.
- There are no clear lines of accountability for the non-food assessment and the appeal processes. The committee structure, the ad hoc nature of attendance in task force meetings and the diverse workloads of task force chairmen create a diffusion of accountability for accuracy, timeliness and appropriateness of hazard monitoring, contingency planning, response strategy development, resource needs assessment and program monitoring. This structure also limits incentives for civil servants to excel in disaster management activities.
- There are no logical lines of inter-ministerial communication or collaboration for integrated, multi-sectoral disaster response strategies. This results in narrow, sectorally-based responses to complex forms of vulnerability.

There is good will within key line ministries for the establishment of emergency offices at least at the federal level. Given the decentralized structure of government, it is important that emergency offices be established on a permanent basis in the regional bureaus as well.<sup>6</sup> Such offices would not be idle during non-(major) crisis years, given the full-time tasks of hazard

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<sup>6</sup> Several people asked why the team did not recommend creating emergency offices at the woreda level. The team argued that, given the increased responsibilities of woreda officials, e.g. for the management of World Bank block grants, it is not realistic at present to expect the woredas to take on additional responsibilities. Establishing offices – and providing them with grant-based contingency funds – at the regional and federal level would be a great improvement over the present system.

mitigation, crisis prevention, disaster response and post-crisis recovery. General terms of reference for emergency offices and line ministry/bureaus might include the following tasks:<sup>7</sup>

1. Baseline information collection and upkeep;
2. Assessment and appeal process management;
3. Early Warning System design and monitoring;
4. Contingency fund management;
5. Coordination of task forces, of integrated disaster response strategies and with DPPC/DPPB and other ministries/bureaus;
6. Tracking and reporting of non-food emergency responses;
7. Maintenance of a central (digitized) information clearinghouse for (and commission studies on) assessments, evaluations, program progress reports, lessons learned and best practices;
8. Adapt and adopt guidelines and minimum standards for non-food emergency response;
9. Teaching (college, university short modules), training (policy makers and practitioners) and study tours (hosted and undertaken);
10. Monitoring of development initiatives for unintended humanitarian consequences;
11. Preparation of disaster mitigation, prevention and recovery initiatives;
12. Drafting protocols for inter-ministerial, inter-sectoral and civil-military collaboration and mutual aid arrangements;
13. Organization of disaster simulations; and,
14. Preparation and dissemination of general disaster management and sector-specific field operations guides.

While coordination on issues of general disaster response is clearly defined, high level coordination structures are less so. As originally envisioned, a nine-member ministerial-level Disaster Prevention and Preparedness National Committee was to meet twice annually as well as when required to support the work of the DPPC. The 2004 Amended Proclamation has relaxed the requirement of ministerial-level representation, stating “Members of the Committee including the chairperson shall be designated by the Government, and their number shall be determined as necessary.” More than one year on, it is not clear if such designations have yet been made. In most countries, disaster management institutions have been established at the highest (civil and military) levels to ensure the government will be prepared to coordinate – by command, if necessary – the disparate activities of line ministries and security forces at the local, regional and federal level in times of emergencies. Such coordination arrangements and operating procedures for inter- and intra-ministerial and civil-military collaboration need to be in place long before such structures are needed. Ethiopia’s ad hoc arrangements could be a liability in times of disaster.

## **Response Strategies**

Given sound management structures and an active program of comprehensive hazard management, the assessment process next turns to questions of devising appropriate responses to identified vulnerabilities. Complex and interlocking vulnerabilities require integrated strategies of response, and this demands a level of sectoral integration not presently realized in Ethiopia

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<sup>7</sup> An excellent study considering the feasibility of establishing an emergency office in the MoWR was written in 2003 - NCA (2003) "Emergency Water Preparedness for Ethiopia Organizational and Technical Assessment Final Report," Norwegian Church Aid, Addis Ababa.

either across government ministries/bureaus or across UN agencies. There does not appear to be coherent disaster response strategies for addressing in a clearly prioritized fashion the full range of the risks and vulnerabilities related to Ethiopia's multiple hazards. For example, community vulnerabilities to disaster-related displacement, environmental hazards, economic shock or HIV/AIDS, and cross-cutting themes such as gender and protection are not adequately addressed in non-food emergency responses.

The team worked with the emergency task forces at the federal level to improve their assessment approaches for estimating non-food emergency needs, including emergency response strategies. The team emphasized the importance of integrated, multi-sectoral response strategies to address imminent threats of acute malnutrition, morbidity, mortality and destitution among rural and urban vulnerable populations. Examples of such strategies are found in the technical annexes of this report but one example of an agriculture-based strategy to complement more traditional health and nutrition interventions might include:

- Emergency purchasing power interventions (debt rescheduling, cash grants, CFW, food commodity price stabilization through local monetization, vouchers for key commodities, oxen-support for vulnerable households; agriculture input support for high value crops);
- Nutrition protection interventions (rapidly maturing vegetable and oil crop seeds; provision of seed oil presses; animal health interventions, destocking, slaughter and distribution of fresh meat; cash-based support to vulnerable households);
- Morbidity protection measures (removal of standing water, CFW/FFW latrine construction, promoting non-maize crop production near homesteads to reduce malaria exposure); and,
- Interventions to increase access to market products (stabilize terms of trade through local monetization of cereals, livelihoods fairs).

The team has suggested that one key to improving non-food emergency interventions is to rationalize strategies across multiple sectors. Devising such strategies will require a range of sectoral experts to work together, e.g. from MoH/MoARD/MoWR/DPPC and from UNICEF/FAO/WFP/OCHA. While the MoH and the MoARD have made recent progress on collaborative efforts for sanitation, government and UN agencies rely on task forces to bring agencies together. This has not been an adequate mechanism for overcoming the institutional momentum that keeps government agencies and organizations focused on 'their' sectors.

In the absence of integrated and transparent response strategies, non-food appeals can give the appearance of 'shopping lists', where numbers of vulnerable populations are translated into lists of needed resources, e.g. metric tons of seeds, dollars for animal health projects, doses of measles vaccine and so on. This 'shopping list' approach does not reflect in a systematic way the many innovations in best practices developed in Ethiopia and elsewhere, or international minimum standards for humanitarian response. In addition, the prevailing model of drought-focused, food aid-dominated disaster management limits the range of responses that are included in the annual appeal for humanitarian assistance. The concept of what is classified as an "emergency" or a "development" initiative currently is differentiated not by *the type of vulnerability* the intervention is seeking to address but rather by *the type of resource* used to respond to the vulnerability.



The difference has important implications for the effectiveness of humanitarian aid resources pledged against appeals, and for the types of assistance disaster-affected populations receive. For example, the higher levels of the MoARD eliminated livestock fodder from the 2005 annual emergency appeal, in part because the linkages between fodder and emergency vulnerability were not transparently defined and in part because the MoARD is extremely reluctant to include anything but animal health and seeds in the emergency appeal. Annex V of this report provides extensive guidance on how such linkages can be described in future emergency response strategies and related resource requests. Similar dissonance characterized negotiations between the WES task force and the DPPC regarding what types of interventions should be considered “emergency” or “development,” e.g. water tankering versus water point maintenance because it was impossible for the DPPC to determine what the relationship was between regular development programs and specific strategies to address disaster vulnerabilities. **The distinction between ‘emergency’ and development should not be based in terms of the type of the response but rather in terms of the vulnerability the intervention seeks to address.** The humanitarian principle of impartiality dictates that humanitarians work to provide whichever forms of life-saving assistance that are identified in the process of assessing needs if it will save lives and reduce suffering. **Strategies to combat acute vulnerabilities can range from the routine to the highly unusual.** Disaster management communities around the world continue to work on developing innovative strategies for addressing acute vulnerability. *Any* strategy employed to address the acute nature of the vulnerability should be properly categorized as an emergency intervention. The nature of such strategies depends upon context, and this is the reason why vulnerability-based assessments are so important in ensuring effective and appropriate disaster response.

**The lack of response strategies, the failure to integrate best practices and the lack of adequate minimum standards for non-food interventions cause a number of problems, not the least of which is that emergency resources are not used for maximum impact.** The ‘shopping list’ approach leaves little room for debates about the best options for addressing such fundamental threats as acute malnutrition in children or livelihood security for IDPs. Donors can ‘pick and choose’ among sectors. Critically, the links between the government’s own strategies for addressing vulnerability and external humanitarian assistance are not articulated. In the absence of integrated, transparent and inclusive strategies for emergency response, various alternatives have been developed, many of which are discrete, area/intervention/project based activities. Some parallel structures have been created, at times coming into conflict with other structures and competing for limited resources, especially for trained personnel – such as nurses needed for nutrition interventions.

In order to respond to disasters effectively, vulnerabilities should be defined and identified, and a range of proxy indicators developed in order to ensure that response strategies are implemented in a timely fashion. More work is needed in this area, especially for the development of multi-sectoral proxy indicators of impending non-food crises. For example, while the ENCU has worked hard to improve the quality of formal nutrition surveys in Ethiopia, rapid and proxy indicators of nutritional crisis have not been integrated into nutritional response strategies, e.g. inflation, increased levels of morbidity, loss of access to livestock products, etc. This issue is explored in Annex III.

## **Resource Requirements, Resource Availability and Appeals**

Resource requirements should be derived from non-food aid intervention strategies. Such requirements include not only the logical needs for funding, but other inputs essential for the success of strategies. In their work with the task forces, the team encouraged assessment approaches that considered a full range of resource needs, such as technical assistance in the form of additional staff or training, organizational support or policy measures. Resource requirement assessments should also consider non-emergency funding mechanisms that may be relevant, such as special transitional/multi-year programs or existing/planned development funds (e.g., the World Bank's PCDP). The team has also emphasized the importance of prioritization in assessing resource requirements so that the full range of available donor resources (emergency/development, programmable/non-programmable) may be accessed.

It is not possible to determine from the present system of contingency planning, assessment and appeal the nature, scale and scope of the FDRE's own contribution to non-food emergency response requirements. In the absence of this information, it is not possible to determine, for example, the contribution of DBS to the non-food appeal, or to fully understand the scale of hazards, risks and vulnerabilities in country, or to see in a transparent fashion the relationship between identified needs on the one hand and the resources requested from the international humanitarian community on the other.

The team advocated a change of approach whereby non-food emergency assessments and appeals would reflect the sum total of all resources that would be required and available to support integrated strategies based on assessed vulnerabilities. This approach requires the identification of the full range of resources available within and across government as well as other accessible resources that can and should be mobilized in the event of a disaster. This would represent a significant change. The current process of assessment and appeals is geared for presentation to the international donor community. The government uses a separate, internal process of budgeting and spending for its own activities. An examination of this year's malaria response strategy shows how line ministries and bureaus, and federal and regional governments tapped existing and extraordinary budget lines in order to stem the epidemic. There are examples from other ministries, e.g. by the MoARD for the control of animal disease and crop pest outbreaks and the release of contingency stocks of supplies from the MoWR. Despite the range of activities taken by government, there is little understanding of the FDRE's contribution to managing hazards, risks and vulnerabilities, leaving the donor community with the uneasy impression that it alone must respond to (non-food) emergencies in Ethiopia.

The lack of coherence between government and donor financing of non-food emergencies creates problems. The extent of 'off-sets', whereby donor, NGO or UN funding for humanitarian programs is reprogrammed from regional budgets, is not always transparently disclosed by the FDRE. Since humanitarian assistance is provided on the assumption that it will be used in addition to existing resources, such off-sets can undermine assistance objectives. The current parallel system of financing means that it is difficult for DBS donors and non-DBS donors to coordinate their response strategies. Over time, with the exception of very large-scale crises, some donors will expect the FDRE to use DBS resource to manage assessed vulnerabilities. By encouraging greater government transparency in its own contributions, DBS donors should be able to understand the relationship between direct support to the government

and governmental strategies for addressing hazards, risks and vulnerabilities. In short, **the effectiveness of the non-food assessment, appeal and response process hinges on harmonization of the internal FDRE and external humanitarian financing systems.**

Because there are already working systems in place in government to deal with crises as they arise, the task forces have been encouraged to assess the need to augment emergency contingency funds that operate on a grant (as opposed to a guaranteed replenishment) basis at the regional bureau level especially. All regional governments currently manage general contingency funds. It is proposed that additional funds, perhaps provided on a cost-sharing basis between government and donors be established and linked to agreed non-food emergency strategies. As before, it is essential that such resources be protected against off-sets.

The gap between identified needs and available resources logically should constitute the content of the appeal. Unlike food aid needs related to drought emergencies, emergency non-food aid needs can rarely be adequately predicted on a twelve month basis so the timing of non-food aid appeals should be considered carefully. Seasonal variations in vulnerability often differ from sector to sector and do not always follow the crop cycle. For example, livestock vulnerability is usually at its height when droughts break and weakened animals succumb quickly to disease, only to die after having survived the drought. Shelter needs can follow heavy rains, landslides or earthquakes, while public health threats like malaria follow their own seasonal rhythms. The varying cycles and unpredictable nature of some crises underscores both the importance of flexible contingency funds and the need to use different appeal mechanisms when requirements outstrip resources. As a general rule of thumb, flash non-food appeals should be used for rapid onset crises; 12/12+ month appeals should be used for needs relating to slow onset crises; and, multi-annual project planning cycles should be used for predictable non-food needs arising from recurrent slow onset crises as well as for some disaster mitigation, prevention and recovery needs, as per Table 2.

**Table 2. Appeal Types by Disaster Vulnerability**

<b>Type of Disaster</b>	Rapid Onset	Slow Onset	Slow Onset
<b>Type of Vulnerability</b>	Acute <b>not</b> Chronic	Acute <b>not</b> Chronic	Acute <b>and</b> Chronic
<b>Type of Appeal</b>	<b>Flash</b>	<b>12 – 12+ month</b>	<b>Multi-year or special transition funding</b>
<b>Selected examples of events and related interventions</b>	Earthquake, flood or conflict related needs for shelter, water, sanitation, health, security, nutrition, cash, etc.	Livestock interventions before, during and after drought, urban CFW for food insecure household affected by inflation or farmers affected by crop losses	FDRE and UN coordination; Agriculture input security for PSNP beneficiaries; EOS program costs; pastoral drought recovery program; capacity building of government; IDP livelihood security

In recent years, the FDRE has moved assertively to establish institutional mechanisms for addressing a portion of the predictable (i.e., chronic) emergency food aid needs upon which some vulnerable populations depend for survival. The PSNP provides an important funding mechanism whereby donors can provide multi-year funding for recurrent cash and food aid needs, freeing the emergency appeal mechanism to address acute but not chronic food aid needs.

Presently, some recurrent humanitarian non-food needs as well as medium-term transitional programs are included in emergency non-food appeals. This is due to inadequacies in planning and funding mechanisms that are unable to address recurrent and predictable non-food needs that fall between short-term acute emergency response needs and longer-term development strategies. As a result, very important non-food transitional and surveillance programs can only be funded through the emergency appeal process. This contributes to a lack of distinction between resources needed for emergency response interventions and other measures for disaster preparedness, prevention, mitigation and recovery.

In theory, some non-food programs in the appeals could be candidates for alternative multi-year programming funding mechanisms, e.g., seed security assistance for a portion of the chronically vulnerable households that are eligible for PSNP, some EOS activities, and coordination functions at the DPPC, FDRE line ministries and agencies. A revision of the DPPC mandate to focus “only on emergencies” and poor responses to previous joint appeals for HIV/AIDS, education, gender and shelter interventions prompted the removal of these sectors from the 2005 appeal.<sup>8</sup> It is not at all clear if these activities have been funded by other mechanisms. This experience highlights the risks of (and explains the reluctance by some humanitarian organizations to support) further limitations on appeal content and scope. However, by removing some predictable non-food activity requirements, the content of appeals (both flash and twelve-month) can focus on providing extraordinary resources for extraordinary needs arising out of extraordinary circumstances. **If some activities are removed from the 12-month appeal, it is critically important that they not be ‘orphaned’, i.e., that they be funded using existing or new funding mechanisms.**

In general, disaster mitigation (including preparedness), prevention and recovery strategies should be funded as key development activities in Ethiopia for the simple reason that without these strategies development investments are extremely vulnerable to disaster losses. In addition, some disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness strategies require multi-year funding commitments, with the quality of programming guaranteed by the rigors of the project cycle process. In general, more investment is needed in hazard-based large-scale disaster mitigation, prevention and recovery strategies.

## **A 10-Point Agenda for Debate**

The team ended its work with a ten-point agenda for strengthening non-food emergency disaster assessments and appeals, contingency planning and the underlying management system needed to ensure that, when crises overwhelm communities, resources are provided in a timely, impartial, appropriate and effective fashion. It is hoped that the government, donor, UN and NGO community can come together to debate and devise an action plan based on this agenda.

1. Strengthen mechanisms and secure high-level support for inter-ministerial (MoH/MoWR/MoARD; RHB/BoWR/BoARD) and inter-agency (FAO/UNICEF/WFP) joint disaster

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<sup>8</sup> IDPs are not appealed for as a separate category but rather their needs are subsumed under sectoral categories. This gives the impression that vulnerabilities related to IDPs are not addressed. The team encouraged IDP status to be monitored as a vulnerable group not unlike single headed households, HIV/AIDS-affected households or other households that may be highly susceptible to crisis.

- management approaches to key threats of malnutrition, morbidity, mortality and livelihoods collapse/destitution;
2. Establish permanent, staffed, capacitated, empowered, accountable and resourced emergency offices in the line ministries/bureaus (health, water resources, agriculture, education);
  3. Donors and FDRE to provide resources for offset-exempt, grant-based contingency funds at the regional level, for rapid non-food responses to zonal and woreda emergency needs; promote increased utilization of the grant funding mechanism in the NDPPF;
  4. Commit to adapting international minimum standards for humanitarian assistance (e.g. Sphere) and innovating best practices in support of vulnerability-based, integrated, multi-sector, non-food aid emergency response strategies;
  5. Conduct (and routinely monitor) comprehensive hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis;
  6. Use existing development resources and create special transition programs/funds to support multi-year initiatives for non-food disaster mitigation, preparedness, prevention and recovery;
  7. Establish (in advance of crises) civil-military and mutual aid agreements (e.g. to govern the transfer of emergency resources between regions);
  8. Increase development investment in components of non-food Early Warning Systems (e.g. baseline livelihoods studies/monitoring and human nutrition/disease and animal disease surveillance);
  9. Strengthen the technical capacity of the DPPC for coordination of non-food emergency responses; and
  10. Develop a system of urban disaster management.

There is good will across government to strengthen systems for disaster management but much work is still needed in order to ensure that the non-food aspects of drought and other hazards are resolved effectively. This is not only a humanitarian issue but is fundamentally a development question. Development strategies must be careful not to proceed apace without considering how development resources can mitigate hazards, build the resilience of communities or prepare the government to manage the nation's complex risk and vulnerability profiles lest they run the risk of failing the people of Ethiopia while building in the seeds of their own failure. Notwithstanding a range of development efforts, one cannot overlook the possibility that a major drought may threaten the lives and livelihoods of millions of Ethiopians in future. Meanwhile, other hazards continue to pose risks to communities across the country in both rural and urban environments. It need not be inevitable that such hazards, serious as they are, should become national and international disasters. It is possible to envision a local, regional and national system of disaster management that identifies threats and quickly moves to respond as a matter of routine.

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
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## Annex I. Water and Environmental Sanitation Rapid Assessment Format Comments

(This is a copy of recommendations on the WES Task Force's assessment format, with a particular emphasis on the need to greatly strengthen measures for the control of diarrhoeal diseases. The team recommended adapting questions based on the Sphere Project to more effectively assess potential environmental hazards, water and sanitation needs. The task force is considering how to incorporate the team's suggestions into their assessments.)

### General Comments

Appeals for external assistance should arise only when prioritized humanitarian resource needs outstrip in-country resource availability, but this is not where the process begins. As a matter of routine, hazards and related risks and vulnerabilities first should be identified and monitored on a constant basis; contingency plans and response strategies should be actively developed, reviewed and refined; as contingencies threaten to become realities, the full range of need resources should be estimated and prioritized, and available resources should be identified. The appeal for extraordinary assistance should be based on the gap between prioritized resource needs and existing or potentially available and accessible resources. This process is depicted below.



The task force will want to ensure that information is gathered on each of these steps in a transparent fashion, even if it is not specifically included in the format designed by the task force. This is useful not only for demonstrating the process by which appeals are based, but is an important structure for mitigating hazards and responding to risks and vulnerabilities before they come national disasters.

Water and Environmental Sanitation are sub-components of a larger strategy of environmental hazard management. Other areas for environmental hazard management include: refugee/IDP

site selection and planning; shelter; disposal of the dead; environmental protection against fires, floods, wind, etc.; and dust control and road construction.

As the task force is well aware, diarrhea is one of the top four lethal diseases in emergencies, especially when in combination with malnutrition. Sanitation and hygiene promotion are therefore essential lifesaving interventions. As a matter of prioritization for protecting human health, lots of water of fair quality is more important than a small quantity of very pure water.

### Specific Comments on the Format

The original text from the assessment format is in italics.

1. This is generally a clear and user-friendly tool.
2. It includes some information that should already exist, based on previous assessments or other sources. Assessment teams should complete this information prior to going to the field and use the assessment exercise for verification only of these types of questions.

We assume the “F/NF” status question is for “Functioning/Non-Functioning”. If so, this question alone does not provide enough information about per capita access and availability of essential water and sanitation services. Questions regarding “Water source” should include information on the average and variance in total, average and variance in quantities of water. Questions regarding “sanitation facilities” should include information on availability and condition of sanitation facilities, e.g. latrines/student or toilets/patients. These questions should be added into the tables on schools and health facilities.

These sections of the assessment form should be completed prior to the field visit:

PA \_\_\_\_\_ Woreda \_\_\_\_\_  
 Zone \_\_\_\_\_ Region \_\_\_\_\_  
 Total Population \_\_\_\_\_ Male \_\_\_\_\_ Female \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mode of life: Farming \_\_\_\_\_ Pastoral \_\_\_\_\_ Agro-pastoral \_\_\_\_\_

#### List of Schools in the PA

<i>No.</i>	<i>Name of the school</i>	<i>Total number of students</i>	<i>Water source</i>	<i>Sanitation facility</i>

#### Health Institutions in the PA

<i>No.</i>	<i>Name of the Health Service</i>	<i>Current Status (F/NF)</i>	<i>Water source</i>	<i>Sanitation facility</i>

We suggest that these 2 tables on institutional water and sanitation issues be amended as per these examples:

#### List of Schools in the PA

<i>No.</i>	<i>Name of the school</i>	<i>Total number of students</i>	<i>Water source</i>	<i>Sanitation facility</i>



		<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>	Type	Ave. litres/ person/ day	Type	# for Boys	# for Girls	Condition A = Acceptable U = Unacceptable

### Health Institutions in the PA

No.	Name of the Health Service	Ave number of staff and patients		Water source		Sanitation facility			
		Men	Wo men	Type	Ave. litres/ person/ day	Type	# for Men	# for Women	Condition A = Acceptable U = Unacceptable

3. “List of major NGO’s assisting Water and Sanitation in the area”. This is baseline information that should be gathered from existing sources/regular reporting in the task force meetings. Two tables NGO, UN and other organizations and their water and environmental hazard activities should be compiled prior to going to the field, and then only verified by the assessment team. A full range of water and sanitation activities should be considered, as well as information on the target population. The example below is adapted from the categories provided in the Sphere Standards (2004). We’ve added in the “project duration” as a way of estimating available resources for identified/expected vulnerabilities. Additional rows should be added in the final format if these tables are used.

Table X. Current and Planned Government and Humanitarian/Development Water Supply or Conservation activities.

Name of Govt office, NGO, UN, CBO, etc.	Location	Project Duration	Water Supply (Human)		Water Supply (Livestock)		Water Supply (Crop)	
			Type	Target Population	Type	Target Population	Type	Target Population

Table X. Current and Planned Government and Humanitarian/Development Environmental Sanitation activities.

Name of Govt office, NGO, UN, CBO, etc.	Location	Project Duration	Excreta Disposal		Vector Control		Solid Waste Management		Drainage		Hygiene Promotion		Capacity Building, Training	
			Type	Target Pop	Type	Target Pop	Type	Target Pop	Type	Target Pop	Type	Target Pop	Type	Target Pop

## Water Supply

The task force may consider the following additional general questions, adapted from those recommended by Sphere (2000).

- How many people are affected and where are they?
- What are the current or threatened water- and sanitation-related diseases? What is the distribution and evolution of problems?
- Who are the key people to consult or contact?
- Who are the vulnerable people in the population? What special risks exist for women, girls, the ill, elderly, disabled, destitute, etc.?

In the original format, four good questions were asked in re: water supply. We've suggested some additional points for each question.

### **Original question 1: *What are the existing water sources in the village for human and livestock? (List type and number of each source)***

We've suggested the following revision:

1. Water sources
  - a. What are the existing water sources for human consumption?
  - b. What are the existing water sources for livestock consumption?
  - c. Are these sources are shared between humans and livestock?
  - d. How much water is available per person per day?
  - e. Is the water available at the source enough for short and long term needs?
  - f. Is the water source contaminated/at risk of contamination?
- Except for the per capita question, this information should be available from previous assessments, baseline surveys or databases. Answers should be filled in prior to going to the field. In the field, answers should be verified.
- Assessments should focus on potential sources of vulnerability, so possible cross-contamination between humans and livestock should be monitored at the source. For this reason, we suggest separating human and livestock consumption questions.
- We've added a question on per capita availability as well as on contamination, since these are key indicators of vulnerability.

### **Original question 2: *Distance to the nearest water source for human and livestock***

We've suggested the following revision:

2. Distance to water sources
  - a. Average cost, distance and time required to access nearest water source for humans?
  - b. Average cost, distance and time required to access nearest water source for livestock?
  - c. Are water points close enough to where people live?
  - d. Is it safe to access water points?
- The information on distance should be available from previous assessments, baseline surveys or databases and should be completed prior to the field visits. Such baseline information is important for identifying trends in changing access to water sources. In the absence of baseline information, questions should be asked directly about trends in changing access, in order to identify new forms of vulnerability.

- We have added the cost and time dimensions to this question because assessment teams should be interested in learning about the relationship between water accessibility and household vulnerability. Assessments should monitor the implications and consequences of changing cost, distance and time needed for water fetching activities by different members of households, especially women and girls.
- We've added a qualitative question on if the water is "enough" and if it is safe to access the water point. These questions are adapted from the Sphere standards (2000 edition)

**Original question 3: *What is the impact of drought, flood or other natural or manmade phenomena on water source in the area? (Drop in water level, damaging of water sources, decrease on well and spring discharge ...) compare the current situation from 2 months ago and last year).***

We've suggested the following revision:

3. Impact of hazards on water sources
  - a. List and describe all natural or man-made phenomena that have impacted water sources in terms of availability, access and quality. Note when the impact started and describe measures that have been taken to alleviate the problem.
- We've reworded this question, eliminating the somewhat arbitrary "2-month" and "last year" reference and instead have added a point instead about when the impact started.

**Original question 4. *Are there irregular displacements in the area because of water problem? To which destination?***

We've suggested the following revision:

4. Displacement
  - a. Are there irregular displacements of people and/or livestock from the area because of water problems? To which destinations? Are future displacements anticipated?
  - b. Are there irregular displacements of people and/or livestock to the area because of water problems? From which destinations? Are future displacements anticipated?
  - c. Have or will these displacements cause conflict?
- We've added to this question to add in an element of considering future displacements, to consider both human and livestock displacement, and to consider the risk of conflict associated with water stress-related displacement.

Sphere (2000) suggests that in addition to the above four question areas, the following questions about water supply may be considered as situations warrant.

- What is the daily/weekly frequency of water supply?
- Is the current water supply reliable? How long will it last?
- Do people have enough water containers of the right kind and size?
- Is treatment necessary? Is treatment possible? What treatment is necessary?
- Is disinfection necessary, even if water supply is not contaminated?
- Are there alternative sources nearby?
- Are there any obstacles to using available supplies?
- Is it possible to move the population if water sources are inadequate?
- Is it possible to tanker water if water sources are inadequate?
- What are the key hygiene issues relating to water supply?

- Do people have the means to use water hygienically?

## **Sanitation and Hygiene**

The following six questions are asked about sanitation and hygiene. We thought some of these questions were too general/vague and have offered alternatives.

### **Original Question 1. *Is there any sanitation facility in the area? List the major types and extent of coverage and status.***

Some alternative questions (based on Sphere 2000) to consider:

- What is the current defecation practice? If it is open defecation, is there a designated area? Is it safe?
- Are there any existing facilities? If so, are they used? Are they sufficient and are they operating successfully? Can they be expanded or adapted?
- Is the current defecation practice a threat to water supply?
- Is the current defecation practice a health threat to users?
- Are people familiar with the construction and use of latrines? Are people prepared to use latrines?
- What are the current beliefs and practices, including gender-specific practices surrounding defecation practices?  
Is there sufficient space for pit latrines, defecation fields, etc.?
- What is the slope of the terrain?
- What is the level of the groundwater table?
- Are soil conditions suitable for on-site excreta disposal?
- Are materials on site
- Do current excreta disposal arrangements encourage vectors?
- Do people have access to water and soap for washing hands after defecation?
- How to women manage issues related to menstruation?
- Are there appropriate materials or facilities available for this?

### **Original Question 2. *How is the condition of sanitation facilities in schools and health institutions in the village? List type and condition.***

This question has been incorporated into the amended tables on institutional water and sanitation facilities and should therefore be eliminated.

### **Original Question 3. *Is there community awareness on sanitation and hygiene practices?***

### **Original Question 4. *Is there any water and sanitation related disease out break in the area (from health institutions or community discussions)?***

Some alternative questions (based on Sphere 2000) to consider:

- What are the vector borne disease risks and how serious are those risks?
- If vector borne disease risks are high do people at risk have access to individual protection? Is it possible to make changes to the local environment (by drainage, scrub clearance, excreta disposal, refuse disposal) to discourage vector breeding?
- Is it necessary to control vectors by chemical means? What programs, chemicals and resources to control vectors are there?
- What information and safety precautions need to be provided to households?

**Original Question 5. *What is the prevalence of water and sanitation related diseases in the last 6 - 12 months (from health institutions or community discussions)?***

With the above questions, this question is fine.

**Original Question 6. *Is there any solid waste disposal facilities?***

Some alternative questions (based on Sphere 2000) to consider:

- Is solid waste a problem?
- How do people dispose of their waste?
- What type and quantity of solid waste is produced?
- Can solid waste be disposed of on site or does it need to be collected and disposed of off site?
- Are there medical facilities and activities disposing waste? How is this being disposed of and who is responsible?

**Sphere (2000) recommends adding questions on drainage**

- Is there a drainage problem? (flooding, shelters and latrines, vector breeding sites, polluted water, contaminated living areas or water supplies)
- Do people have the means to protect their shelters and latrines from local flooding?

**Intervention Strategies**

The above section is followed by a general area for “***Recommendations for the site***”.

This section should be split into two parts and provide structure for responses on: 1) A recommended strategy to address the full range of health risks and 2) a description of the interventions, an estimation and prioritization of total resources needed (financial, technical, organizational, political), an estimation of total resources available (by source) and an estimation of the gap between needed and available resources to support the strategy.

## **Annex II. Case Studies of Oromiya and SNNPR Non-Food Assessments and Response Strategies for Non-Food Emergency Needs**

*Woreda:* All woreda officials are expected to complete an assessment each year. The woreda has an assessment tool to determine basic information such as weather and climate information, crop production, livestock conditions, market condition, income sources, health situation, relief distribution, food security and estimation of needy population. The DPPO speaks with kebele leaders and conducts *belg* and *meher* crop assessments. For the 2005 appeal, DPPO for one woreda in SNNPR determined that there were 33,000 emergency beneficiaries in Awassa Zuria. The final number sent from the region was 12,700. The DPPO did not know how this number was determined from what he originally sent to the concerned zonal and regional bodies. The woreda health officer did not have any input on determining non-food emergency needs for the 2005 appeal.

Zonal officers interviewed said that they did not know how the emergency non-food numbers for the appeal were determined. Agriculture/livestock officers reported that there is a process used to identify vulnerable people and make a request, usually to FAO and various NGOs each year, for drought-related needs. For floods and landslides, the zone immediately reports any crises to DPPC Regional.

Regional RHB: There is a continuous surveillance system on disease epidemics and other public health needs from woreda to regional health bureau to the DPPC when necessary. For emergency needs determination, there is trend analysis of disease as well as an assessment process, with woreda ownership. The RHB looks at their annual budget and what the Federal MoH and Regional Council will provide, e.g., the regular budget for epidemic control. The gaps left are what is included in the emergency appeal. The numbers reflected in the 2005 appeal were the same ones forwarded by the regional health bureau to DPPC regional in SNNPR.

BoWR: The bureau representative had no knowledge of emergency water needs being assessed or sent on to DPPC. However, there is a UNICEF officer working with the water bureau who said he was responsible for the emergency water need figures for SNNPR in the 2005 appeal. He indicated that the numbers that appeared in the appeal were the same as sent to the Federal level.

BoARD: The assessment process includes participation in the multi-agency task force to determine emergency agriculture and livestock needs. One interviewee said that the task force is actually an exercise in verification, as the needs are determined prior to the multi-agency emergency assessment from the kebeles up to the zonal and bureau level. The BoARD looks primarily at drought and flood hazards. The numbers that appear in the appeal are the same that were sent to the federal level. The bureaus assume that the zones inflate their numbers and the zones assume that the woredas inflate their numbers, so the figures forwarded from the region represent 20-30% of the woreda's original figures. The bureau has no budget for emergency response.

Capacity: The capacity building bureau has a development focus and therefore does not appeal for emergency needs. They believe the numbers for capacity building come from the DPPC.

DPPB is responsible for reviewing and submitting non-food emergency needs. It is expected that once numbers are sent to the federal level, they will increase or decrease by 5-10%. They have no budget for responding, except for some non-food items for rapid onset emergencies, e.g., blankets for floods. DPPC regional has no relationship with Ministry of Federal Affairs, e.g. on issues pastoral vulnerability. Drought, flood, conflict and IDPs are monitored by DPPC. The chart below provides an overview of how emergency non-food numbers are determined at each level.

	<b>Oromiya</b>	<b>SNNPR</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
Woreda	Woredas send needs to zones	Woredas conduct assessments and send figures to the zonal and regional authorities. The largest decrease in numbers was between the woreda and the region.	
Zonal officers	Zones send needs to regions	Zones conduct assessments and send appeal requests to the regional bureaus and in some cases, UN agencies	
Regional Bureaus	Participate in multi-agency task force assessment, compiles numbers from the zones and woredas for emergency non-food needs and establish its own needs estimate	Compile numbers from the woreda and zonal level. Numbers held by the agriculture/livestock bureau and health bureau were the same as those sent to the regional DPPC	Some types of identified non-food emergency needs at the kebele, woreda, zonal and regional level that are not reflected in the final appeal document.
DPPB	Participate in multi-agency assessments; participate as observers of multi-agency task force activities	Participate in multi-agency assessments	Figures adjusted by region, Task force, line ministry and DPPC for Oromiya. Appeal figures different from original estimates of woredas and zones and in some cases, regions.

**Hazards:** Oromiya and SNNPR regional, zonal and woreda officials were asked which hazards they planned for assuming the following could result in emergency non-food needs in Ethiopia: drought, flood, environmental hazards, human, crop and animal disease outbreak, HIV/AIDS, earthquakes, landslides, erosion, displacement, conflict, urban hazards, population pressure, resettlement, water harvesting, safety net delays and economic shocks.

	<b>Oromiya</b>	<b>SNNPR</b>	<b>Remark</b>
Hazards monitored	Drought, floods, displacement, water and pasture conditions, human and livestock disease outbreaks, crop pests, market prices of cereals and livestock	Drought, floods, population pressure, disease outbreaks, water and pasture availability	Drought is still considered the main hazard in both regions.
Hazards not monitored	Diarrhoeal disease outbreaks, Land slides, erosion, environmental hazard	Diarrhoeal disease outbreak, environmental hazard	Important hazards such as emergencies related to resettlement, the Safety Net, IDPs, etc. are difficult to discuss in terms of hazard profiling.

**Monitoring Methods:** While methods of monitoring hazards differs greatly between regions and different levels within the regions, there are monitoring tools, both informal and formal in place to communicate information particularly in relation to drought status. In general, risks of crises are not forecast.

Oromiya	SNNPR	Remarks
Weekly phones calls rainfall, status of crops, pasture and water condition, human health and any other hazards; Pre/Post harvest assessments	Pre/Post harvest assessments Continual epidemic surveillance Monthly crop and market monitoring	Real time information is obtained through weekly phone calls in Oromiya. Phone bills could be sharply reduced if SMS capabilities were restored.

**Management Structure:** The various roles and responsibilities are described for both regions. There are no specific emergency officers in the line bureaus. Further, much of the emergency non-food planning is determined by people within the bureaus who are performing other duties, or in some cases, UN officials.

Oromiya	SNNPR	Remarks
Kebeles- DAs fill in assessment forms	Kebeles- Das fill in assessment forms	
Woreda officers for health, water and sanitation, agriculture and livestock, Woreda DPPO	Woreda officers for health, water and sanitation, agriculture and livestock	
Zonal officers for health, water and sanitation, agriculture and livestock- no designated emergency personnel	Zonal officers for health, water and sanitation, agriculture and livestock	No designated working full time on emergencies in any of the sectors
DPPB responsible appealing for most emergency non-food needs	DPPC Regional responsible for appealing for most emergency non-food needs	Same as above
Regional bureaus for health, water and sanitation, agriculture and livestock- no designated emergency personnel	Regional bureaus for health, water and sanitation, agriculture and livestock	
Regional council	Regional council	

**Response Strategies:** Response strategies were found to be based on one sector, as opposed to integrated response strategies including health, water and sanitation, agriculture and livestock. In addition, strategies were limited to single response solutions within a sector (for example, only seeds for crops and animal health for livestock). Strategies were highly dependent on appealing to the regional government or external aid agencies. In some cases, some types of interventions requested at the woreda level were deleted from the appeal document at the Federal level.

	Oromiya	SNNPR	Remarks
Agriculture Livestock	Response limited to seeds and animal health intervention through FAO and the DPPC	Response limited to seeds and animal health intervention through FAO & the DPPC	Response limited to single type of intervention despite requests for support for a range of interventions. Post-crisis recovery assistance not assessed/requested.
Water	Emergency water provision calculated at 5 litres / person /day; No emergency sanitation response strategies	No emergency water provision standard given No standards for livestock No emergency sanitation response strategies	Water needs considered only for the human population and not for livestock. The provision of 5 litres per day (in Oromiya) is below the minimum standard of 15 litres per day to maintain consumption, health and hygiene
Health	Info was not available	Strong response strategies for epidemic control No response strategies for diarrhoeal disease outbreak	

**Resources:** Resources available at the regional level are outlined below. Neither zonal or woreda level officials have access to emergency non-food funds, but they can appeal to the Regional Council through designated bureaus.

	Oromiya	SNNPR
Regional	Has contingency funds that may be	Has contingency funds that may be allocated to non-food



Council	allocated to non-food responses	responses
DPPB	Can request contingency funds from Regional Council that may be allocated to non-food responses	DPPC has access to some non-food items for flood response; does not have a specific non-food emergency needs fund
BoARD	Through FAO and federal DPPC. Occasionally the regional council may request funding from Food Security for specific purposes	Through FAO and Federal DPPC; no contingency funds held within the bureau
BoWR	Through UNICEF	Can request to Regional Council or UNICEF; no contingency funds held within the bureau
MoH	Info was not available	Has epidemic emergency funds at the regional level; can appeal to Regional Council or UNICEF for additional non-food emergency health needs; can appeal to Federal DPPC (ENCU) for emergency nutrition needs

### Regional Needs:

Regional officials in line ministries and officers in the zones and woredas reported they required the following in order to respond more effectively to non-food emergency needs: non-food emergency contingency funds available within the Regional Government; trained manpower and capacity for emergency response; capacity on how to request for assistance for different non-food emergency needs; and disaster management training.

Many common themes were identified between Oromiya and SNNPR. Some include:

- Appeal figures are adjusted at all levels. While it is often assumed that non-food emergency needs figures are inflated, both case studies demonstrated that the numbers of emergency non-food needs were significantly decreased at the regional level, and in some cases, again at the federal level. People “on the ground” are performing assessments and have methods of determining figures for non-food emergency needs. While some of these methods are questionable and need to improve, there are serious issues of distrust that are pervasive at all levels, with each higher level assuming that overestimations of needs have been made.
- Government contributions towards needs were unclear. While the government through the regional council or DPPB responds to non-food emergency needs, there are no details on how or if such contributions are subtracted from the estimations provided for inclusion in appeals. Non-inclusion of government contributions gives the inaccurate impression that the government is not making any effort to alleviate the plights of the population.
- Emergency management capacity and skills remain uneven in different line ministries, DPPB, zonal and woreda levels.
- Multi-hazard vulnerability monitoring is undertaken at woreda, zonal and regional levels. The quality and methods of monitoring hazards significantly depends on the bureau. Some key hazards are not monitored. Forecasting of crises, based on hazard analysis, is generally not conducted.
- UN and NGO involvement in the appeal process influences the final numbers more than other factors. The presence of UN liaison officers in the various bureaus may inadvertently decrease bureau ownership of the appeal process. This is related to the problem that officials are overstretched at every level. Disaster management responsibilities compete with a host of other bureaucratic and technical responsibilities.
- Interventions are not guided by agreed upon, established minimum standards, guidelines and best practices. No officials were familiar with Sphere standards.

### **Annex III. Assessment and Response to Non-food Emergency Nutrition Needs**

All known causes of malnutrition are at play in Ethiopia: food insecurity, poor health, hygiene and sanitary conditions and inappropriate feeding and care practices. A large proportion of the population lives in absolute poverty with inadequate sanitation, unsafe water supplies, poor diet and limited access to quality health care services, rendering them highly vulnerable to shocks. The synergistic interaction between inadequate dietary intake and disease constitutes the primary, most direct and immediate cause of malnutrition in Ethiopia. This is one reason why acute malnutrition rates in Ethiopia remain stubborn, even in the face of extensive food-based intervention strategies. Disease weakens nutritionally vulnerable people and can result in death even with adequate access to food.

The underlying and basic causes of malnutrition are not systematically addressed by the nutrition community in Ethiopia. Sanitation and hygiene, closely linked to diarrhoea, intestinal parasites and other diseases, should be monitored and addressed but they generally are not. Gender as a vulnerability should be monitored from an emergency nutrition standpoint because maternal literacy rates are significantly correlated to child mortality level while household coping systems often infringe on the caring environment for children; care as a cause of malnutrition generally is not addressed in a way to prevent or ameliorate acute malnutrition. The relationship between economic shock, inflation, and acute malnutrition risk is not monitored; neither are urban-based nutrition threats and crises. Overall, better coordination and a broader range of interventions are needed to ensure that integrated, multi-sectoral responses across a range of government ministries, bureaus and offices, UN agencies and NGOs are pursued so that nutritional vulnerability is addressed before GAM and SAM rates reach critical levels.

Notwithstanding this state of affairs, the nutritional data collection and response mechanisms of RHB, DPPB/C, WFP, UNICEF and NGOs have begun to address some aspects of inadequate food intake and elements of health complications. Disease is not yet adequately identified or responded to from an emergency nutrition perspective, although the EOS includes important preventative public health outreach measures, such as vitamin A supplementation, de-worming and measles vaccinations. Importantly, the treatment of diarrhoeal disease, such as the routine provision of ORT, once a hallmark of nutrition interventions, is lacking in current responses.

To strengthen technical expertise, the Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit (ENCU) was established in 2000 within the Early Warning Department of DPPC. The ENCU, funded by UNICEF, monitors and coordinates nutritional assessments, surveys and EOS screening for areas affected by drought and, to a limited extent, floods, epidemics, conflict, resettlement and safety net delays. The ENCU's purpose is to improve the quality and timeliness of nutrition-related information, primarily to govern the use of food aid and other resources in emergency-affected areas. The ENCU has established a system to collect and analyze nutrition and morbidity data to detect changes in the nutritional status, map the global picture of malnutrition throughout the country, and plan interventions to prevent further deterioration. Marked achievements in improved quality and quantity of nutrition information have been made by ENCU-led initiatives in the past three years, and have contributed to the ability to compare areas based on standardized information – a notable improvement over the 1999/2000 crisis (Spiegel et al., 2004). The guidelines and strategies that have been established for EOS, standard 30 x 30

nutrition surveys and rapid assessments ensure that technically sound nutritional data is collected in identified “hot spots” throughout the country.

The ENCU participates in some assessments/surveys and is responsible for chairing MANT (Multi-agency Nutrition Task Force), which includes NGOs and UN agencies. The ENCU has the federal ownership of emergency nutrition coordination, but much of technical response rests in UNICEF and NGOs. UNICEF works closely with both ENCU/DPPC and Regional Health Bureaus, particularly in the implementation of EOS. While not without its shortcoming, the strategy of EOS provides access twice per year to all under-fives and, importantly, their mothers.

The Joint Evaluation of the 2003 drought determined that further improvements were needed to deepen the ENCU’s technical and managerial expertise, to strengthen the existing early warning system and to institutionalize nutrition surveillance, preparedness and response. Despite investments and improvements, the capacity of ENCU to coordinate, monitor and advocate for non-food aspects of nutrition (e.g., health care, water, sanitation, hygiene) remains inadequate. The linkage between the MoH and the DPPC historically has been weak; coordination of nutrition issues between these two institutions is almost non-existent. There are not clearly defined monitoring arrangements on key issues, particularly diarrhoeal disease outbreaks, between the ENCU and the MoH/RHB. As other studies have recommended, technical nutrition surveillance, information, response decisions and debate should also be managed by MoH as a way to heighten focus on disease as an immediate cause of malnutrition and related morbidity and mortality. There is a nutrition unit within the Family Health Department of MoH but it does not have an emergency perspective. In general, the link between technical nutrition information and federal and regional disease surveillance should be markedly increased.

To achieve best practices in emergency nutrition, adequate and appropriate staff at the kebele and woreda level need to be in place to assess monitor and respond to underlying and immediate causes of severe acute and moderate acute malnutrition. A number of resources for nutrition surveillance and response are in place, as are skilled health workers at the regional level. Many woredas have health posts which can accommodate OTPs for CTCs. Regional hospitals now have NRUs for treating 7,200 cases of severe acute malnutrition. UNICEF is funding the hiring of 2,800 community health workers for the HEP program whose major responsibilities will include community level nutrition monitoring. These community health workers will also need to be trained (and given access to resources) for acute emergency response at the woreda level. To improve emergency nutrition response in addressing both inadequate food intake and disease, improvement in the sanitation sector is critical.

Presently, the threshold used to determine whether or not to respond to nutritional emergencies depend on levels of GAM and SAM. GAM and SAM are problematic, particularly when interpreted independently of confidence intervals which can highlight sampling errors. Instead, to address both inadequate food intake and disease as immediate causes of malnutrition, a wider range of measurements to gauge nutritional risk and vulnerability should be discussed and agreed. Vulnerability thresholds should take into account a range of indicators, but often GAM and SAM rates are the only data considered in decision-making. There is a wealth of information collected in regular early warning monitoring systems, nutritional assessments and standard surveys relating to food availability, quality and access issues, livestock conditions, household coping mechanisms, water availability and quality, and human morbidity. This information, much of which is collected by NGOs, should be interpreted as valid proxy

indicators of nutritional stress and reports should be shared with regional, zonal and woreda officials to encourage multi-sectoral information exchange and related integrated responses.

Additionally, ENCU/DPPC and MoH/RHB, with the support of donors, UN agencies and NGOs, can work towards the following:

- Promote mitigation components into emergency response by including hygiene, sanitation, care promotion and nutrition education in programmatic response;
- Practice prevention of multiple causes of malnutrition in all sectors;
- Develop comprehensive post-crisis recovery strategies to address all underlying and basic causes of malnutrition. Particularly after a TFC or CTC has been conducted, ensure that supplementary food is available (as well as livelihood security, agriculture input security and/or livestock interventions are pursued) to prevent remission of successfully treated severe acute malnutrition;
- As the EOS expands, assist woredas to respond to rising levels of reported moderate severe malnutrition and related public health crises before high GAM/SAM levels are detected;
- Create an appropriate pastoralist nutritional vulnerability surveillance system and response mechanisms;
- Consider alternatives to TSFP to address moderate acute malnutrition; and,
- Establish emergency contingency funds at the regional and woreda level to respond immediately when surveillance data indicates a potentially critical situation.

## **Annex IV. Resources Donated to the Health and Nutrition and Water and Environmental Sanitation Task Forces**

Several resources were donated to the MoWR Water and Environmental Sanitation Task Force by the consulting team, including the following books and training manuals:

- Adams, J and Wisner, B., 2002, Environmental health in emergencies and disasters, WHO, Geneva.
- Cotruvo et al., 2004, Waterborne Zoonoses, Identification, Causes and Control, East Sussex.
- Davis, Jan and Lambert, Robert, 2002, Engineering in Emergencies, London.
- LeChevallier, M and Au, Kwok-Keung, 2004, Water Treatment and Pathogen Control: Process Efficiency in achieving safe drinking water, Essex.
- Norwegian Church of Ethiopia, 2003, Emergency Water Preparedness for Ethiopia Organizational and Technical Assessment Final Report, Addis Ababa.
- WHO, 1999, Community Emergency Preparedness: A manual for managers and policy-makers, Geneva.
- WHO, 2000, Operation and Maintenance of rural water supply and sanitation systems, Geneva.
- WHO, 2000, Sanitation Promotion, Geneva.
- WHO, 2000, The Phast Initiative- Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation, Geneva.
- WHO, 2000, The Phast Initiative- Step-by step guide- participatory approach for the control of diarrhoeal disease, Geneva.
- WHO, 2003, The Right To Water, Geneva.
- WHO, Fewtrell, L. and Bartram, J., 2001, Water Quality: Guidelines, Standards and Health Assessment of risk and risk management for water-related infectious disease, London.

Several resources were donated to the Health and Nutrition Task Force by the consulting team, including the following books and training manuals:

- Adams, J and Wisner, B., 2002, Environmental health in emergencies and disasters, WHO, Geneva.
- Cohen, Raquel, 2000, Mental Health Services in Disasters: Manual for Humanitarian Workers, Pan American Health Organization (2 copies).
- LeChevallier, M and Au, Kwok-Keung, 2004, Water Treatment and Pathogen Control: Process Efficiency in achieving safe drinking water, Essex.
- Pan America Health Organization/WHO, 2001, Disaster Mitigation in Health Facilities- CD-ROM,
- Pan American Health Organization, 2000, Humanitarian Assistance in Disaster Situations, A Guide for Effective Aid, Washington DC.
- Pan American Health Organization, 2001, Establishing a Mass Casualty Management System, Washington DC.
- Pan American Health Organization/WHO, 2004, Management of Dead Bodies in disaster situations, Washington DC.
- Rozendaal, Jan A., 1997, Vector Control, Methods for use by individuals and communities, WHO, Geneva
- WHO, 1992, Entomological field techniques for malaria control, Part I. Learner's Guide, Geneva.
- WHO, 1992, Entomological field techniques for malaria control, Part II. Tutor's Guide, Geneva.
- WHO, 1993, The child, measles and the eye, Geneva.
- WHO, 1998, The New Emergency Health Kit, Geneva.

- WHO, 1999, Community Emergency Preparedness: a manual for managers and policy-makers, Geneva.
- WHO, 1999, Rapid health assessment protocols for emergencies, Geneva.
- WHO, 2000, Design and Implementation of Health Information Systems, Geneva.
- WHO, 2000, Management of Severe Malaria- a practical handbook, Geneva.
- WHO, 2000, Sanitation Promotion, Geneva.
- WHO, 2000, The management of nutrition in major emergencies, Geneva.
- WHO, 2002, Management of severe malnutrition: a manual for physicians and other senior health workers, Geneva (2 copies).
- WHO, 2003, Guidelines for the inpatient treatment of severely malnourished children, Geneva (2 copies).
- WHO, 2003, The Right To Water, Geneva.
- WHO, 2004, Guiding principles for feeding infants and young children during emergencies, Geneva.
- WHO, 2004, Management of the child with a serious infection or severe malnutrition: guidelines for care at the first-referral level in developing countries, Geneva.
- WHO, 2004, Serious childhood problems in countries with limited resources, Geneva.
- WHO, Fewtrell, L. and Bartram, J., 2001, Water Quality: Guidelines, Standards and Health Assessment of risk and risk management for water-related infectious disease, London.

## **Annex V. Agriculture and Livestock Emergency Management**

Existing agriculture and livestock monitoring mechanisms mainly focus on selected causes of hazard – drought, floods, conflicts, displacements, human and livestock disease outbreaks and crop pests. Effects are measured in terms of seed shortages, livestock diseases, pest outbreaks, pasture and water problems and unusual migration. Resettlement areas are monitored through ad-hoc arrangements. Less attention is given to other types of hazards, for example, erosion, landslides, ‘settled’ IDPS, forest fire or on critical issues arising from the PSNP, resettlement, water harvesting and other development initiatives. In Oromiya, information regarding such hazards is obtained on real time basis through weekly or bi-weekly telephone calls that may lead to flash appeals for assistance from government budgets, depending on the scale of the disaster. It is suggested that monitoring mechanisms should include all anticipated disasters.

The existing appeal process for the sector is handled by the Agricultural Task Force (ATF) at the federal and regional levels. The ATF’s responsibility is limited to assessing global seed and animal health requirements for the appeal process, contingency plans and flash appeals. It also attempts to compile data on needs, pledges and actual commitments, though this is proving difficult as many NGOs do not cooperate for various reasons.

Current assessment methodologies include a standardized ‘emergency agricultural inputs requirements’ format to be completed by woreda offices to feed information for the pre and post harvest assessment teams to determine needs. The team provided extensive comments on this format (see Annex VI). Estimated need figures compiled by the woreda offices are adjusted at the woreda, zonal and regional levels and ultimately by the Agricultural Task Force (ATF) following quick assessment surveys in the pre and post harvest cycles. Figures produced by the ATF may be adjusted once again at the line ministry and finally by the DPPC. The final need figures in the appeal document can differ substantially than those produced by the woreda, zonal or regional offices. The DPPC insists that they have no way of knowing how non-food needs assessments are conducted at the various levels before they receive them. In light of the situation, it is difficult to know whether the final figures reflect the reality on the ground. Occasionally, some response strategies identified as needs at the woreda/zonal/regional levels have been deleted from the appeal at the line ministry level (e.g., animal concentrate/pellets). The ‘emergency agricultural inputs requirements’ format includes numerous questions related to baseline information rather than focusing on actual needs and/or deviations from normal situations. Storing baseline information in databases at the federal and regional levels could alleviate the burden on the woreda staff and help them put their efforts in assessing actual needs.

The following adjustments to the current structure are suggested given the recurring nature and scale of disasters in Ethiopia.

### **Establishing Emergency Offices in the MoARD/BoARD**

Staff assigned by the Ministry and the Regional Bureaus coordinate the activities of ATF in addition to their regular duties whereas recurrent disasters warrant dedicated emergency offices for at the federal and the regional level. It is proposed that emergency offices consist of two units, one for agriculture and another for livestock because each sector is too important to be subsumed by the other, while it is imperative that the units complement each other. It is

important that the role of this office be expanded beyond just assessing needs to include that of prevention, disaster mitigation, response and recovery staged response strategies, of documentation best practices and development of guidelines for future use depending on the type of disaster. The following is a draft presented here to stimulate debate and planning on the establishment of emergency offices:

**1. Baseline Information Collection and Management** (Types and numbers of livestock by woredas for both highland and pastoral areas; Prevalent livestock and crop diseases by agro-climatic zones and zones/woredas; Known major constraints to production, health, animal and human movements (water, pasture, conflicts) by zone/woreda and/or agro-ecological zones; Patterns of known crop pest and disease outbreaks following certain disasters (e.g. droughts, floods); Normal and distress migration routes, destinations, and potential for conflict during such movements; Distress migration-related epidemiological patterns (for ex. Pastoral animals contracting liver fluke when migrating to swampy areas in the highlands); Average prices of animals by species during normal times by season, agro-ecological zone and zone/woreda administrative unit; Demarcation of major Belg and Meher areas by agro-ecological zone and /or woreda; Crop types, average planting area and yield by agro-ecological zone and/or zone/woreda (for Belg and Meher areas); Average size of landholding for poor, middle and better-off households; and Main sources of seed (local, commercial, relief etc); Compile and maintain hazard and risk maps (drought, disease outbreaks, conflicts, flood zones, landslides, soil and water erosion, etc.)

**2. Assessment Process Management**, in conjunction with the Agriculture and Livestock Task Force (Prepare baseline information for inclusion in assessment forms for verification by assessment teams; Organize logistical arrangements for assessment teams; Development, refinement and review of contingency plans; Review and refine assessment forms and methodologies; Conduct data analysis on assessments; and Encourage best-practice intervention strategies, based on assessed needs (See the attached “Brief Guidelines on Livestock-Related Emergency Interventions”); Ensure that strategies are flexible enough to cater for changing circumstances (e.g., changing from destocking activities to restocking if the rainfall situation improves); Encourage diversification of production to high value and drought resistant crops; Ensure that response strategies reflect the stage in the drought cycle to cater for prevention, response and recovery strategies (for example, importing and planting date trees along the Awash and Shebelle rivers could serve as prevention strategy to minimize hunger); Collaborate and coordinate with other offices within the MoARD/BoARDs, other line ministry/bureau emergency offices (e.g. Health, Water Resources), other task forces (health and nutrition, water and environmental sanitation), the DPPC/DPPB (including the ENCU), other ministries/bureaus and humanitarian agencies (UN, NGO) to ensure that intervention strategies are integrated and multi-sectoral, if appropriate, to reduce human risk and vulnerability to morbidity, malnutrition and destitution; Identify resource requirements for interventions strategies, including financial, organizational, technical and political resources; Identify available and potential resources from government (line ministry, regional governments), NGOs (local and international), UN agencies and private sources; and in collaboration with the DPPC/B, assist in the formulation of appeals for external resources)

**3. Early Warning System Management.** The following drought cycle management system (adopted by the Arid and Semi Arid Rangelands Management Program in Kenya) differentiates the various phases of drought for pre-planned responses accordingly. This model represents




drought management for pastoral communities in Kenya. Droughts are presented as inevitable for these pastoral communities and outlines four stages of drought preparedness, mitigation, relief and recovery.

**Normal:** No unusual fluctuations are observed from the norm in the expected seasonal range regarding environmental, livestock and pastoral welfare.

**Alert:** Unusual fluctuations are observed in the environment outside expected seasonal ranges, within the entire district or within localized regions. Asset levels of households are still too low to provide an adequate subsistence level. Vulnerability to food insecurity is still high.

**Alarm:** Indicators fluctuate outside expected seasonal ranges affecting the local economy. This condition occurs in most parts of the district, and directly and indirectly threatens food security of pastoralists and/or agro-pastoralists.

**Emergency:** All indicators are fluctuating outside normal ranges. Local production systems have collapsed as well as the dominant economy within the district. This situation affects the asset status and purchasing power of the population to an extent that welfare levels have been seriously impinged resulting in famine threat.



DROUGHT CYCLE MANAGEMENT MODEL - © Acacia Consultants 2002

**4. Contingency fund management** (Establish contingency funding to be managed at the line ministry or regional level to respond quickly to emergencies; Pre-position agricultural inputs for

predictable disasters such as pest or disease outbreaks close to the disaster area using contingency funding.

**5. Coordination** (Chair the Agriculture and Livestock Task Force; Encourage rational resource allocation, e.g. monitor who is doing what where (NGOs and others), identify response gaps according to needs; Monitor agreed uniform implementation modalities with implementing partners, e.g. partial cost recovery for veterinary drugs, camel water tankering instead of using expensive trucks, seed security assessment procedures, etc.; and, Compile periodical activity reports from government and implementing partners)

**6. Documentation of Lessons Learned** (Serve as a central (digitized) information clearinghouse for assessments, evaluations and program progress reports; Maintain a library of key training manuals and other resources for use by a wide range of actors; Commission evaluations of different types of response strategies and interventions; Monitor experiences in other countries to identify best practices; and Document and disseminate studies of coping strategies used by a range of vulnerable agricultural and pastoral populations in Ethiopia.)

**7. Adapt Guidelines and Standards** (Monitor international guidelines and standards for best practice in mitigation, prevention, response and recovery strategies for agricultural and pastoral communities; Adapt guidelines and standards of best practices for each type of intervention, in consultation with implementing partners, with particular emphasis on community-based approaches; and, Make policies, guidelines and best standards known to relevant stakeholders through workshops and other dissemination channels)

Given the prevailing attitude regarding disaster responses viewed in isolation to prevention, mitigation or recovery strategies, a capacity building component should be an integral part of the emergency office to change the KAP of high officials at the DPPC, MoARD and the Regional Bureau level. Response strategies need to be geared towards Phased Disaster Management Systems (PHDS) to prevent, mitigate and recover communities. Study tours and in-country trainings are highly recommended to bring about such changes in emergency agriculture and livestock interventions.

### **Vulnerability Response Strategies**

The current appeals for the agricultural sector are limited to seeds and livestock health needs. Annual seed requirements for the last five years have been estimated between \$5-6 million, including seed provisions for chronically food insecure households. The recurrent and predictable nature of these needs necessitate reprogramming the response strategy for both types of interventions. Chronic seed requirements should be addressed through multi-year seed security strategy for PSNP and other vulnerable areas, incorporating the promotion of local seed production, alternative varieties and cultivars, diversification, etc, and emphasizing measures to redress barriers to access to seeds.

Circumstantial evidences suggest that most animal health problems are linked to chronic problems due to poor allocation of resources for the sector both at the Federal and the Regional level. It is disconcerting to note that the sector is constrained by financial limitations despite the government's effort to promote live animal and meat exports for which investing in animal

health is the crucial first step. Donors should advocate that more resources are allocated for this sector from the government budgets to support animal health surveillance and interventions - instead of funding both chronic and acute needs through the humanitarian appeal process.

Too often, responses to emergency agricultural or other needs are delayed due to the time required to assess the situation, alert the international community and galvanize resources. Critical lead time is lost in the process resulting in human sufferings and mortality. Key to circumventing this constraint is earmarking *emergency contingency funds* that can be released on a grant basis to cater for predictable or unforeseen needs on time at regional/zonal or woreda level. Budget flexibility and contingency planning should be part of all drought management. Contingency planning cannot be made operational in the absence of adequate financial mechanisms, such as rapid response funds. For each organisation, it is crucial to have a clear agreement (memorandum of understanding) with their funding agencies on the proper management and the rapid deployment of these funds in case of emergencies.

Promoting mitigation in regular development programs is key to recovery strategy. For example, the introduction of drought resistant, high yielding (potatoes, sweet potatoes), highly nutritive (avocado) and high value crops (oil crops) as part of a development program could mitigate the effects of cereal crops failures. The focus should be in designing emergency response and development strategies in a complementary manner. Develop comprehensive post-crisis recovery strategy to minimize the chances of communities falling into chronic and/or acute disasters. For example, the food security status of pastoral communities could be greatly improved by planting dates along the Awash and Wabe Shebelle rivers.

Gender concerns should be taken into account, because women and men face different challenges in times of emergency. For example, for women, water shortages are often a bigger problem than food shortage, especially when the type of food aid offered requires preparation with ample water -water that is obtained only by trekking long distances.

Despite recurring disasters, neither best practices nor guidelines have been documented and developed for the agricultural and the livestock sector despite Ethiopia being the origin of most types of disaster response norms and strategies. Institutionalizing best practices through assessments and evaluations to develop guidelines for planning emergency strategies in the agricultural and livestock sector is crucial for managing future disasters.

Needless to say assessing needs, designing staged response strategies (preventive, response, mitigation and recovery stages), documenting best practices and developing guidelines for each type of emergency response require that adequate and appropriate staff are assigned in the line ministry whose skills need to be upgraded from time to time through study tours and appropriate trainings.

Developing integrated emergency relief strategies should be encouraged for vulnerable agricultural and pastoral communities than relying on single interventions. For example,

- Human nutritional crisis in pastoral communities require a range of interventions involving destocking (provision of meat), market subsidy (for increased off-take), provision of pellets and or concentrates (for milking cows and shoats), animal health and rangeland protection, community-based therapeutic centres, water and sanitation, etc.

- Malaria outbreak in farming communities may require cash for work interventions for drainage, non-maize seeds for planting near houses, livelihood fairs, as well as treatment and hygiene promotion.

These issues were explored in depth in Lautze, et al (2003) “Risk and Vulnerability”, in the section on “Brief guidelines on livestock-related emergency interventions for pastoral areas,” reproduced below for ease of access.

### **Drought off-take/destocking**

- Start early in alert/alarm stage before livestock lose value.
- Introduce the program to the community in an open meeting
- If possible, form ‘Meat Relief Committees’ that will oversee program implementation and relieve NGOs from unnecessary administrative duties.
- Develop criteria to select those who would be eligible to sell; if contractors are required to supply animals organize the local women group as contractors.
- Specify the kind of animals to be purchased by the program.
- Set blanket price per species (for shoats, cattle or camel) respectively by negotiating with the community; Women traders, if contracted, can then work out the price at which they buy animals from far-off areas to make some profits for themselves.
- Agree with communities from the outset that the hides and skins are to be handed over to women or other organized groups in the area. Such groups can sell the hides and skins to set up their own businesses.
- Identify the target group for meat distribution; in some cases these may include institutions such as schools, clinics, prisons etc.
- Agree with the communities on slaughtering programs –i.e. once or twice a week.
- Distribute live shoats/cows/camels to the selected families – perhaps 1 shoat per 4 families or 1 cow/camel per 30 or 40 families. Let beneficiary communities slaughter the animals and distribute the meat among them. The NGOs need only to verify the slaughtering.
- Don’t indulge in the preparation of dry meat unless this is absolutely necessary. It is time consuming, expensive and logistically difficult. Always provide fresh meat to communities – don’t forget that fresh meat satiates hunger more than dry meat.
- Depending on the law of the land local veterinarians can carry out pre-mortem and post mortem inspections.
- Livestock feeds distribution
- This should be done only for reproductive animals.
- If this program is simultaneously carried out with destocking, then pastoralists should share the cost of the feeds being provided.
- Agree with the communities on the number and types of animals each family is allowed to bring to the feeding center.
- The distribution of livestock feeds to those who wish to feed non-reproductive animals should be done at full cost.
- Ensure that adequate water is available where distribution takes place as concentrates or urea-molasses make the animals thirsty.
- Consider the costs of transportation when designing the proposal, as this could be costly.

### **Restocking**

- Set the selection criteria with communities but make sure that dropouts are not included.
- The restocking program should only support the traditional restocking mechanism (*Zakat, titihaya, xolgoyo etc*) and not replace it.

- Agree on the proportion of the community contribution to each potential restockee family from the outset.
- Always buy shoats for a restocking program – they are cheaper and fast reproducing than cattle or camels. However, any restocking program should include at least one pack animal (a donkey or a camel) as this provides mobility to the restocked families.
- Purchase animals locally as importing from outside incurs high logistic and administrative costs and might also introduce new diseases to the area.
- Ensure that the animals contributed by communities and purchased through the program are healthy.
- Provide vaccination and treatments for internal/external parasites before distributing the animals.
- Mix those contributed by the community and purchased through the program and distribute the animals by drawing lots to avoid bias. In some cases, those who have contributed animals may make prior arrangements to take back their animals once the program has distributed the stocks. The mixing of animals and distributing by drawing lots would prevent this arrangement from taking place. A proper restocking program should consider a minimum of 20 shoats and one pack animal per a family.
- If the program intends to reach more people than the available budget at the time, arrangements can also be made to distribute the off-springs to those families not covered in the initial restocking program

### **Animal Health**

- Agreements should be reached by all implementing agency whether the animal health program is to be implemented through a cost recovery program from the outset depending on the drought situation.
- Carrying a destocking program simultaneously would help pastoral families to pay for the cost recovery.
- If possible, a uniform cost recovery rate should be applied in all operational areas (assuming that the drought situation is the same).
- CBAHs should be employed to undertake the animal health program under the supervision of qualified personnel.
- CBAHs could be paid through the cost recovery system.
- Provision of Temporary Water Sources
- Set up ‘Water Users Associations’ in each community likely to be supplied with alternative water sources.
- Define the rules and regulations with the communities on the utilization of the water source. This may include payment for gas, spare parts or fees per species, communities to be served etc.
- Make sure that the water source is not to result in unwanted permanent settlement. A prior agreement with communities is therefore necessary for the capping of boreholes or the destruction of ponds after the drought to avoid resentment or confrontations.
- Where boreholes are designed to function for a certain period of the year, make arrangements for the communities to meet the costs of operation and maintenance.

### **Transport Subsidy**

- A well-planned control program should be enforced to prevent traders from taking advantage of the program (animals have to be branded or painted and certificates have to be issued for the animals passing through check points en route to final destinations).
- Obtaining data of previous years on the number of livestock sold from the district/woreda would help to determine if the transport subsidy has resulted in the export of more livestock from the operational area.
- The level of subsidy, though dependent on the budget and the target number of animals to be removed, has always to be agreed with the traders to avoid bias.

- Payments should be effected only after a trader has transported the animals to destination points and upon submitting all the required paper works.
- No payments should be effected for selling or transporting animals within the district as this would lead to pilfering of resources (from the Kenyan experience). Besides, the objective of the transport subsidy is to remove as many animals from drought affected areas to terminal market points and not to relocate animals within the affected area.

## **Annex VI. Emergency Agricultural Inputs Requirements Assessment Methodology**

(This is a copy of suggestions made to the Agriculture and Emergency Task Force's assessment formats.<sup>9</sup> The team met with representatives from the task force to discuss ways of improving assessments to more effectively inform emergency agriculture and livestock-based approaches to disaster vulnerabilities, especially human malnutrition and morbidity. The task force is considering how to incorporate the team's suggestions into their assessments.)

The assessment tools focuses on issues of availability without adequate attention to issues of access and utilization, the other key components of food security. Good work on assessing access to seeds has been done by CGIAR and ICRASAT, e.g. by Dr. Louis Sperling (l.sperling@cgiar.org). Dr. Sperling will be in Ethiopia beginning the week of September 13, 2005 and the task force is encouraged to work with her on issues of assessing access to seeds.

The assessment methodology/exercise seems designed to fulfil many functions:

- a. Gather baseline information on woreda-level agriculture and livestock data
- b. Assess the current and, to a limited extent, expected crop and livestock production
- c. Estimate resource needs for inclusion in appeals
- d. Gather information on on-going interventions

Due to these multiple functions, the questionnaire appears overly long and complicated, while important issues are not explored. Also, some of the information in the questionnaire may be gathered by other assessment teams, e.g. the early warning working group, as well as by other offices in government. The questionnaire should be designed to fill gaps in information not already gathered elsewhere, in order to ensure the quality of information and to minimize the burden on already assessment-weary woreda officials. Most of the baseline information collected through this assessment should be available on databases at the Federal level and the assessment should focus on deviations from the baseline to minimize the workload on woreda staff.

The tool should focus on assessing vulnerabilities relating to current and foreseeable crop and livestock performance. The present approach of assessing "emergency agriculture input requirements" could be usefully refocused on assessing "emergency agriculture and livestock vulnerabilities, response strategies and resource requirements". Assessment teams should focus on the tasks of hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis, response strategy design, resource estimates and prioritization, documentation of available resources and determinations of the gap between needed and available resources for inclusion in the appeal.

Humanitarian non-food response strategies should be designed, resourced and managed using complementary, integrated, multi-sectoral approaches. The agriculture and livestock task force has tremendous potential to fill a gap in emergency non-food response strategies in Ethiopia, particularly with respect to the mitigation and response to human malnutrition and morbidity vulnerability. To date, agriculture and livestock responses have been oriented towards the important issues of increasing crop production through the provision of seed and protecting

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<sup>9</sup> The original formats are too long to be included in this report. Copies are available from the task force.

livestock herds through animal health measures. However, this approach fails to capture the full range of emergency interventions that the agriculture and livestock sectors can contribute to reducing suffering in emergencies. In particular, the sector needs to collaborate more closely with the health, nutrition, water and environmental sanitation/hazard sectors, in addition to strengthening its own capacity for assessing and understanding vulnerabilities relating to on- and off-farm income for farming and pastoralist communities in times of crisis. For example, the inclusion of non-farm income in the assessment will help determine if the population has access to seed or animal health services without external support.

This approach requires the non-food task forces to work together (ag and livestock, water and environmental sanitation, health and nutrition) in addition to measures needed to increase collaboration across the key ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development, Water Resources and Health at the federal and regional level. This needs to be supported by collaborative efforts among the UN agencies, including the obvious candidates of FAO and UNICEF, but also WFP (to ensure that emergency food aid is not provided if non-food interventions will be more effective), UN AIDS, UNFPA (for emergency reproductive health) and ILO (to encourage greater involvement of ILO's global InFocus emergency cash-for-work and other employment activities in Ethiopia). Both the DPPC and OCHA have particular roles to play in supporting and rationalizing integrated emergency non-food responses.

The nature of funding mechanisms (humanitarian and development) and development priorities often means that important issues of hazard mitigation, disaster prevention and post-crisis recovery are not adequately addressed by either humanitarian or development resources. In addition to strengthening development strategies for hazard, risk and vulnerability mitigation and disaster prevention, special programs for post-crisis recovery should be designed for farming and pastoralist populations. To the extent that these activities can be funded outside of emergency appeals, other funding mechanisms should be pursued. When these activities are included in the appeal, they should be presented in a fashion that clearly articulates how the intervention strategies will address life-threatening vulnerabilities (human malnutrition, morbidity and mortality) and serious threats to the livelihoods systems on which farmers and pastoralists rely for coping with and recovering from crisis.

### **Specific Comments:**

**Overall Structure:** The structure of checklists/formats needs to be standardized as the current document is a mix of a list of questions, followed by blank lines (especially the Amharic version). Where tables are used, the answers should be coded in order to facilitate ease of analysis.

### **Checklist for weather and agriculture activities monitoring outline – general comments.**

The list needs to cover the full range of hazards relevant to farming and pastoralist populations from both a production and consumption perspective (drought, flood, conflict, erosion, plant pests, livestock diseases, economic shocks, as well as humanitarian crisis arising from transitional periods in development programs, e.g. resettlement, PSNP, water harvesting). The approach should consider the special vulnerabilities of households with compromised asset status, e.g. female headed households, households limited labour availability/ill members,



households without oxen, recently dispossessed pastoralists groups, etc. Such info should be stored on the database to make comparisons on status changes from year to year.

Especially with reference to question 2.5 on crop failure: Intervention strategies need to be supported by a much broader range of interventions beyond seeds and animal health, and woreda, zonal and regional officials should be encouraged to work with assessment teams to devise response strategies that will effectively mitigate or ameliorate risk and vulnerabilities. Some examples (based on experiences in Ethiopia and other countries) of emergency interventions for farming communities to address threats of human malnutrition and morbidity include:

Emergency purchasing power interventions (debt rescheduling, cash grants, cash for work, food commodity price stabilization through local monetization, vouchers for key commodities, oxen-support for vulnerable households)

Nutrition protection interventions (rapid maturing vegetable and crop seeds, provision of seed oil presses, animal health interventions)

Morbidity protection measures (removal of standing water, CFW/FFW latrine construction, promoting non-maize crop production near homesteads to reduce malaria exposure)

Interventions to increase access to market products (stabilize terms of trade through local monetization of cereals, food aid distributions; livelihoods fairs)

Crop, soil and water protection and conservations measures.

Some examples (based on experiences in Ethiopia and other countries) of emergency interventions for pastoral and agro-pastoral communities to address threats of human malnutrition and morbidity include:

Interventions to maintain access to fresh milk for nutritionally vulnerable households (livestock feed/concentrates, livestock fodder, livestock water and animal health measures targeted at a core breeding herd; establishment of *fresh* (not powdered!!) milk centres for nutritionally vulnerable populations)

Interventions to increase access to meat for nutritionally vulnerable households (cash-based destocking and local slaughter with fresh meat distribution; dried meat interventions)

Interventions to increase access to market products (subsidized transport of commercial livestock traders/abattoirs, stabilize terms of trade through local monetization of cereals, food aid distributions; livelihoods fairs) The range of available options should be known to the community for them to decide on the most appropriate strategy. Such decisions should not be left to woreda staff alone.

Pest Conditions. It would seem that this is the kind of information that should be available through the work of the crop disease/pest control offices at the federal and regional level. All information like this that is gathered by other offices should not be asked of woreda officials. Questions under #6 (under additional checklist for pastoral and agro-pastoral areas) include good examples of questions that looks ahead to potential vulnerabilities. Questions relating to potential conflicts between pastoral groups and between pastoral and agricultural populations should be included.

Question 6.3 asks “is there a need for water intervention”. Information gathered on water needs should be closely coordinated with water/environmental assessments to avoid duplication.

Question 7. Questions pertaining to the size of herd are not likely to generate useful information. Information should be based on trends in herd size, e.g. 7.4 instead. The main questions need to identify households that are at risk of losing their core breeding stock. The numbers of these

households, and the size of livestock herds for these households, should be gathered as a measure of vulnerability.

Question 8. Belg/meher crop production prospects. It is not clear how these questions relate to the information gathered by the early warning working group, or the EWS of the DPPC. Overlap should be minimized while coordination should be maximized.

Key missing questions: The assessment tool appears to assume that food security is met through on-farm production. Growing evidence shows that most rural households pursue multiple and diversified on- and off-farm livelihoods strategies. The tool does not appear to track vulnerabilities relating to rural livelihoods systems, e.g. the impact of debt on households, trends in on- and off-farm income opportunities/prospects/wages, trends in remittances. The tool does not seek to understand issues of diversification in crop, vegetable and other production from food security point of view, e.g. the role of nutritionally-valuable vegetable crops for nutritionally-vulnerable households, including communities with high overall prevalence of HIV/AIDS. In the last few years, debts emanating from access to ag inputs have become major drawbacks on rural household income. A question regarding debt status need to be included in the assessment to identify vulnerability.

**Annex 1. Livelihood (English version), Annex 2. Main sources of livestock feed, Annex 3. Livestock populations in area, Annex 4. Common Livestock Diseases**

These annexes gather baseline information that should already exist in files, past assessments, other government offices, etc. All efforts should be made not to ask woreda officials information that has already been gathered/exists elsewhere.

**Annex 5. Woredas under safety nets and intervention types**

This information is available at the federal level Food Security Bureau and should not be asked of woreda/zonal officials.

The safety net only covers food aid and cash. Questions regarding water, animal health, feed supply and fodder development would pertain to other, non-safety net interventions managed by the Food Security Bureau or other offices within the MOARD.

**Annex 6. Woredas under food aid**

This information is available from the DPPC and WFP at the federal level. Information should be gathered from the federal level and where gaps exist, further information should be gathered from the regional authorities.

**Table: Impact of Seasonal Rains (Belg, Sugum, etc.) on Livestock Production**

It appears that some of the information gathered in this table is repeated in the tables on the following pages “Feed and Water information” and “Disease and Mortality information”.

Like other tables, answers need to be coded in order to facilitate analysis and consistency in responses.

“Hotspot woredas” is an unclear category.

Under “Livestock at risk/affected” it is not clear how the 3 sub-categories should be completed – is this total numbers?. “At risk” is not defined.

Under “Major Problems”

Questions about “Unusual Migrations” should gather information where animals migrate to and where from, and the implications/consequences of such migrations to both the migrant and the host communities.

Under “Disease Outbreak”, basic epidemiology requires that questions about disease include not only “type” and “frequency” but more specifically duration, population, case fatality rates, etc. This type of information should be routinely gathered by livestock disease surveillance systems in government but the system is weak, necessitating the inclusion of these types of questions in emergency assessments.

“Security” should be added as “major problem”. In addition, information should be gathered on other sources of pastoral stress, e.g. distress sales of livestock, unusual human labour migration, including migration to towns, incidence and risk of raiding and banditry, migration to farming areas, etc and potential conflicts arising between the host and migrant communities.

“Suggested solutions” should not be included in this form, which should limit itself to gathering information on vulnerabilities. A separate form regarding “response intervention strategies” should be included that provide regional/zonal officials including affected communities to express their views on the RANGE of interventions (short-, medium- and long-term – rather than “emergency” and “long term”) that could be pursued to resolve the identified vulnerabilities.

### **Table Feed & Water Information.**

Questions regarding feed and water should be removed from the previous table to avoid duplication.

The questions in this table pertain only to availability of feed and water. Important questions regarding issues of accessibility and control of these resources by certain groups/communities are not included. Access questions include access to market-based sources of feed and water, access to seasonal routes. Exceptional or problematic barriers to access should be identified. It should further identify which populations are facing which barriers.

“not problem” should be eliminated since it is very, very rare that livestock populations do not face problems of some sort for feed and water. Instead, a category of “normal problems” should be used.

The NB usefully tries to look ahead to the end of the year.

### **Table. Disease and Mortality Information (English).**

This type of information should be gathered routinely through livestock disease surveillance systems.

The vulnerability assessment should instead seek to identify those types of livestock morbidity and mortality that have created vulnerable human populations and/or pose a serious threat to destitution of livestock-owning populations.

### **Form. Seasonal Information Gathered From the Field (Amharic)**

This form includes baseline information (e.g. on low-, mid- and high-land areas) and should not be asked again of officials if it can be helped.

Question 1.2 will be very difficult to analyse in this form. Either space should be included after each question to allow for the answer, or the questions should be put into table form and coded (this is preferred).

Question 1.3 asks good questions about a range of hazards, including frost, hail, flood and landslides that are not included in the English version. Questions should be put into table form and coded.

Questions 1.4 – 1.6 ask good questions that get at issues of abnormal events. However, it cannot be determined how this relates to human vulnerability, e.g. questions regarding the # of households affected and the average % of crop losses/household are not included, but should be.

Table 1.7 seems to be a partial repeat of question 1.3, 1.4 and 1.6. This could all be consolidated into one table.

### **Form 2. Farming Situation (Amharic)**

Table 2.1.1 “Land Preparation” and table 2.1.2 “Seeding and harvest” ask baseline information that should be gathered from previous assessments and simply verified in current assessments, rather than ‘starting from scratch’ Such information should be found/included in databases. Land preparation questions should include questions regarding access to oxen for ploughing and identify households that face labour and oxen shortages as a source of vulnerability “Normal” needs to be explicitly defined, subject to the potential/specific conditions of the area. 2.1.3 provides a useful opportunity for assessors to discuss the reasons for differences in land prep and seeding. However, there is no attempt to assess the impact on farming families of these differences. Questions should try to get at not just “why” but also “who” is affected by issues of land preparation and seeding and to what extent vulnerability is heightened by these issues. There are no questions regarding access, availability and utilization of high value or highly nutritious crops for vulnerable households, which is important particularly in areas where mixed cash and food crops are grown

### **Table 3. Agriculture Supply and Use (Amharic)**

Questions on seed should include farmers’ own use of seeds plus issues of unusual barriers to access for seed, e.g. disruptions in social networks for seed exchange, market disruptions, supply issues, etc. These issues should be discussed with Dr. Sperling, who can provide ready-made guidance on seed security assessment methodologies. This section should also include whether inputs were accessed on loans or through cash purchase. If on a loan basis, assessments should gauge likely impact on the population in case of crop failure, economic shocks, and interest rates as measures of vulnerability.

Question 4 below the table should ask not only about outbreaks but also about measures taken.

Question 5. These questions regarding pasture and water supply are already asked on other forms and should not be repeated.

Question 6. These questions regarding animal diseases are already asked on other forms and should not be repeated.

Question 7 regarding fears/expectations of animal diseases includes a very useful series of questions that try to anticipate future vulnerabilities.

Question 8 asks about unusual livestock migration, which was already asked on earlier forms.

As before, the implications of migration are not included, but questions are asked about to/from livestock migration.

Question 9. asks a series of questions about livestock problems relating to natural disasters and man-made conflicts and tries to map out the areas affected. As above, these questions were already asked earlier in table format.

Question 10 “any additional information” is useful.

### **End of Section I**

### **Checklist/Formats for Agricultural Emergency Intervention Monitoring II**

**Unnamed Tables “2005, Reporting Period, Organization, Emergency Agriculture Input Intervention” and “2005 Reporting, Emergency Agriculture Input Intervention (Livestock intervention) (English)**

It is not clear to us if these tables are intended to be completed during the assessment exercise, or if they are completed at other times. These tables are monitoring forms, not assessment forms, and are designed to gather information on on-going interventions. Monitoring is a separate function from assessment and the two activities should not be conducted at the same time. Assessments should draw on existing monitoring information so they are informed by a comprehensive map of existing resources.

These forms do not relate interventions to assessed needs/vulnerable populations. They are input monitoring forms, as their names suggest. We did not look at the whole process of monitoring, so we do not know how these forms complement other monitoring activities. A separate format can be prepared to gather info at the regional level to identify available resources for ag and livestock needs from the government.

## **End of Section II**

### **Checklist/Formats for Field Assessments**

#### **Checklist for 2005 Belg season assessment (English)**

See p. 2 of this document for comments on “Checklist for weather and agriculture activities monitoring outline – general comments (English).” Those comments pertain to this checklist as well.

Impact evaluations of emergency interventions should be conducted separately from vulnerability assessments. This should not be an objective of the belg season assessment.

The objective of the assessment should be to assess vulnerabilities relating to agriculture crop production during the Belg season, not just strictly issues of crop production.

2. Land preparation/planting questions should also assess land, labour and oxen-related vulnerabilities/limitations/barriers, including identifying households that suffer from these particular types of vulnerability, and the particular challenges such households face in land preparation and planting.

Plant Diseases do not seem to be assessed

Under 4. “agricultural inputs supply and utilisation,” issues relating to farm-level debt management and related vulnerabilities should be included.

Point 5 is very good.

Under 6 “others”, questions should explore the relationship between vulnerability and prices, and food security in general. Cash crop options, e.g. chat sales, should be related to vulnerability as well.

For questions 7 & 8, see our comments on livestock, fodder, water, health issues, etc., already explored above.

Question 9, Evaluation of interventions should be separated from the assessment processes.

However, it is important to assess available, accessible and potential resources for interventions.

These forms should be re-worked to get at issues of budget levels at the regional, zonal and woreda levels that are and will be available from the technical ministries, dppb, regional governments and woreda governments, in addition to determining the existing and planned level of interventions undertaken by UN agencies, NGOs and other humanitarian actors.

Question 10, ‘estimate emergency seed and livestock requirements’. This checklist should be reconstructed to focus on “emergency response strategies required for vulnerable agricultural, agro-pastoral and pastoral population” so that a broad range of interventions are considered, including those managed directly by MoARD and BoARDs as well as in collaboration with the MoH, MoWR and the DPPC.

### **Format 5. “Input Supply Status for 2004 meher crops planting as of now”**

This format doesn't ask whether HHs have received adequate amount of inputs through loans, cash purchase or as a form of emergency assistance. The relevance of the format is to assess the level of input supplies at the woreda level rather than assessing vulnerability at the HH level.

### **Format 6 “Area (ha) Production (qt) & yield/ha comparison between 2005 pre and post-harvest results, Meher season (For peasant holdings only)”**

Data on last year's and this year's estimated production level should be available from the CSA which is more reliable as they use a proper sampling format than woreda sources.

“Peasant holdings” are not defined

It is not clear how this information relates to vulnerability at the household level since it deals with issues of average yields and overall trend changes. Issues of crop performance among vulnerable households are not explored.

Information on the 2004 area/yield/production should be available from the previous year's assessment forms/data base

### **Format 7**

#### **“Area (ha) Production (qt) & yield/ha comparison between 2005 pre and post-harvest results, Meher season, for state/private (commercial) farms only**

“commercial farms” is not defined

Information on the 2004 area/yield/production should be available from the previous year's assessment forms/data base or from CSA

This question provides info on general production levels but not related to food accessibility to vulnerable families

### **Form Belg and Long-Cycle cereals (checklist) (Amharic)**

This form has different objectives than the English version of the same checklist. See our comments above regarding the checklist objectives (English) form.

Question 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 relate to areas according agro-ecological zones, which should already be available from earlier assessments, data bases, etc. If these questions have to be asked, they should be put into table form, with answers coded.

Question 1.4, 1.5, 1.6 should relate to question 1.3, not question 1.2.

Questions 1.4., 1.5 and 1.6 contain useful questions but lines should be provided after each question to ensure that each question is answered, rather than asking many questions and leaving one series of lines to answer it.

## **2. Rainfall Situation (Amharic)**

Question 2.1 is a baseline question regarding the timing of belg rains according to agro-ecological zone and should be available from previous assessments/data bases, etc.

Question 2.2. should be split into several questions with lines following each question to ensure that each question is answered.

Please see comments before for questions from 2.4 to 8

## **9. Market Situation**

This is erroneously number “9”. It should be 10.

All tables should be coded.

9.1 “prices of 4 major crops as compared to last year”. This type of information is already gathered more systematically by CSA, WES, FEWS, etc.

If the questions 9.1 and 9.2 (livestock prices) are to be asked by the assessment teams, this should be put into table form to show changes in the terms of trade.

### **10. Diseases.**

Questions regarding human disease outbreaks and measures taken are gathered by health assessment teams as well as routine health surveillance. The crop and livestock assessment should consider, but not directly collect, this information.

Information on livestock diseases in the previous belg seasons should be available from earlier assessments, data bases, etc.

These and subsequent questions (through to 13.2) seem to be asked in two forms – written responses and tables. See our comments on similar tables.

### **End of Section III.**

### **Checklist/Formats for Assessing Emergency Requirements IV.**

Form 1 – Emergency seeds requirement assessment format – column 4 loading and unloading costs could be changed to ITSH (internal transport, storage and handling) costs to cover all costs outside of the cost of seed. There are some differences in the Amharic and English versions. Reasons for applying emergency seeds assistance should include accessibility, availability and quality issues among other things.

The Amharic and English versions of the format for emergency livestock needs are quite different. The English version includes such interventions as destocking, restocking etc whereas the Amharic version does not (table 5 in Amharic). The formats should be identical. In addition, leaving some lines at the bottom of the table would enable woreda people to include other forms of appropriate interventions than those listed in the column table.